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CONSTITUTIONALIZING REHABILITATION DID NOT
WORK: LESSONS FROM INDIANA AND OREGON AND A
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MARCUS ALEXANDER GADSON*

Calls for promoting rehabilitation as part of criinnaljustice
reform have echoed across the political spectrum for decades.
Indiana and Oregon embarked on an interesting experiment in this
area-recognizing the primacy of rehabilitation In their state
constitutions. Both states' constitutions were drafted with sections
declaring that the state's criminal law "shall be founded on the
principles ofreformation, and not of vidictivejustice.' 2 Since courts
will play an indispensable role in crafting sentences that promote
rehabilitation, the Oregon and Indiana courts' Imteipretation of these
sections invaluably informs how other courts might treat a greater
focus on rehabilitation. This Article argues that appellate courts in
Indiana and Oregon have incorrectly interpreted these sections and
effectively nullified them. The Article then considers various
explanationsfor why appellate courts refused to enforce the sections.
Counterintuitively,politicalsensitivity on the partofelectedjudges Im
Indiana and Oregon does not explain the phenomenon. Instead, the
* Marcus Alexander Gadson, J.D., Harvard Law Class of 2015. I would like to thank
Carol Steiker, Nicole Garnett, Ron Sullivan, Former Indiana Supreme Court Justice Frank
Sullivan, Antonia Domingo, and James Barta for their insightful feedback on previous drafts
of this article.
1. E.g., Texas Rehabilitation Programs Reduce Recidivism Rates, RIGHT ON CRIME
http://rightoncrime.com/2011/05/texas-rehabilitation-programs-reduce-recidivism-rates/
(last
visited July 1, 2017).
2. IND. CONST. art. I, § 18; OR. CONST. art. I, § 15 (amended 1996). In 1984, Oregon
voters adopted Article 1, Section Forty of the Oregon Constitution, reading, "Notwithstanding
sections 15 and 16 of this Article, the penalty for aggravated murder as defined by law shall be
death upon unanimous affirmative jury findings as provided by law and otherwise shall be life
imprisonment with minimum sentence as provided by law." Then, in 1996, Oregon voters
repealed the 1857 language and replaced it with the current Article I, Section Fifteen: "Laws
for the punishment of crime shall be founded on these principles: protection of society,
personal responsibility, accountability for one's actions and reformation." This article does not
address jurisprudence surrounding Current Article I, Section Fifteen because, unlike its
predecessor provision and IND. CONST. art. 1, § 18, it does not prioritize the objective of
rehabilitation.
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Article concludes that Oregon and Indiana appellate judges have
lacked a workable framework to apply them. Finally, the Article
proposes a framework for Indiana courts to consider challenges under
its provision.
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INTRODUCTION

The idea of reforming the justice system is en vogue. It is the
rare issue in modem politics that finds support across the political
spectrum-from Senator Bernie Sanders on the left, 3 to the Koch
brothers on the right.4 Those seeking to improve the justice system by
placing a greater emphasis on rehabilitation should pay particular
attention to Indiana and Oregon. Those states embarked on a truly
bold experiment in criminal justice reform: constitutionalizing
rehabilitation as the most important purpose of punishment. They did
so in constitutional sections with no analogue in the federal
Constitution or that of any other state. Article I, Section Eighteen of
the Indiana Constitution reads: "[t]he penal code shall be founded on
the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice."' Until it
was amended in 1996, former Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon
Constitution read: "Laws for the punishment of crime shall be
3. Philip Bump, Bernie Sanders Pledges the US. Won'tBe No. I in Incarceration. -e'll
Need to Release Lots of Criminals, WASH. POST: THE Fix (Mar. 6, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/03/06/bernie-sanders-pledges-the-u-s-wontbe-no-1-in-incarceration-hell-need-to-release-lots-of-criminals/?utm term=.ebff01Oec9d.
4. Molly Ball, Do the Koch Brothers Really CareAbout Criminal-JusticeReform? THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/do-the-kochbrothers-really-care-about-criminal-justice-reform/386615/.
5. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
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founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive
6
justice."
These sections, however, have largely failed to change the way
appellate judges in Indiana and Oregon reviewed sentences.7 On
appellate review, Indiana and Oregon courts have erroneously
interpreted these sections and consequently nullified them. This
Article considers both political and jurisprudential explanations for
this failure. While the idea that elected judges have invalidated these
sections for fear of looking weak on crime has intuitive appeal, it is
incorrect. Instead, the most likely explanations are appellate judges'
failure to develop workable frameworks due to a lack of training, and
the increasing reliance of state judges and lawyers on federal law
when considering constitutional rights issues. Oregon repealed former
Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution, but Article I,
Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution remains in force. Finally,
I propose a practical framework Indiana courts could use at the end of
this article that would bring its jurisprudence more in line with the
text and purpose of Article I, Section Eighteen.
II.

HISTORY

The Indiana Constitution of 1816 required the legislature "as
soon as circumstances will permit, to form a penal Code, founded on
the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive Justice." 8
Alabama's Constitution of 1819 contained an identical provision.' As
early as 1827, Indiana Governor James Ray cited the section to decry
overcrowded prisons.10 A contemporary newspaper article questioned
whether whipping was consistent with the provision." However, no
published Indiana or Alabama cases construed their respective
constitutional section. Alabama's next constitution, ratified in 1865,

6. OR. CONST. art. I, § 15 (amended 1996).
7. The Article will argue that there is one potential exception where the section has had
an effect-Indiana cases involving the so-called doctrine ofamelioration. See infra Part Ill.
8. IND. CONST. of 1816, art. IX, § 4.
9. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. VI, § 19.
10. Elihu Stout, Governor's Message, WESTERN SUN & GEN. ADVERTISER (Vincennes,
Ind.) (Jan. 6, 1827), https://newspapers.library.in.gov/cgi-bin/indiana?a=d&d=WSGA182701
06.1.1&srpos=3&e-182-en-20--1-txt-txlN-%22vindictive+justice%22-.
11. G.W. Johnston, WESTERN SUN & GENERAL ADVERTISER (Vincennes, Ind.) (June 2,
1827), https://newspapers.library.in.gov/cgi-bin/indiana?a=d&d=WSGAl8270602.1.3&srpos=
4&e182-en-20-1-txt-txlN-%22vindictive+justice%22
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did not contain similar language.1 2 Indiana courts only considered
what was meant by a penal code "founded on principles of
reformation, and not of vindictive justice" after the state adopted
Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution in 1851.
Before 1851, Indiana's penal codes underwent gradual, but
substantial changes. The first criminal code was the decidedly harsh
Marietta Statutes, enacted when the area that would become the state
of Indiana was part of the Northwest Territory.1 3 Treason, murder,
and arson all carried the death penalty.1 4 Harsh punishments were also
prescribed for other crimes. Robbery and burglary could lead to
whipping or imprisonment for up to 30 years. 5 A similar penal code
existed after the area became the Indiana Territory in 1800.16
Little changed when Indiana officially joined the Union in 1816.
In the state's first penal code, the death penalty was the mandatory
sentence for treason, murder, rape, and carnal knowledge of a female
under ten years old.17 For 25% of the crimes defined in the penal
code, a convict could receive a whipping in addition to a fine and
imprisonment. 8 By 1821, however, whipping had fallen into
disfavor. 19 That year, the legislature authorized the construction of a
state prison in Jeffersonville. 20 It also prescribed prison sentences for
crimes that had once been eligible for whipping. 2 1
At first, Indiana's prisons seemed well-situated to promote
reform. Inmates worked together during the day, but then retreated to
separate cells at night.22 Reformers assumed that isolation would give
the convict the time and space to contemplate past misdeeds and how
to atone for them. 23 This was similar to other penitentiaries, such as
Cherry Hill prison in Philadelphia, which had a policy of absolute
isolation. 24 Within several years, however, a perception developed
12. See ALA. CONST. of 1865.
13. David J. Bodenhamer, CriminalPunishment in Antebellum Indiana: The Limits of
Reform, 82 IND. MAG. HIST. 358, 361 (Dec. 1986).
14. Id at 361.
15. Id
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id.
19. Id. at 362.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 363.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners:A Brief
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that the prison administration was failing to reform prisoners, and
often actually exacerbating their negative tendencies. 25 The New
Albany Gazette alleged that the prison superintendent administered
ninety-five lashes to a boy for failing to keep fires going in a kiln. 2 6
There were widespread reports of overcrowding and a lack of
supervision for prisoners.2 7 Indeed, concerns about poor prison
conditions were part of the impetus for Article I, Section Eighteen of
the Indiana Constitution. 28
At the same time that the state's prison system developed,
reformers pushed for far more radical changes to the state's penal
code. In 1830, Governor James B. Ray called capital punishment a
"primitive practice," and said that he found it inherently problematic
because of the prospect of executing an innocent person. 29 He called
for an end to the death penalty that year, but the legislature took no
action. 30 The next year, he called for an end to public executions.31
Though these attempts failed, the legislature had major debates over
ending capital punishment in 1843 and 1846.32 The legislature also
gave courts discretion to impose life imprisonment instead of capital
punishment.3 3 But capital punishment itself was never outlawed. In
fact, an attempt to abolish the death penalty for all crimes except
premeditated murder at the 1851 convention failed.34
The criminal justice system in the Oregon Territory-recognized
by Congress in 184835- was considered primitive, even by its own
citizens. After "the substantial log jail" in Oregon City burned down
in 1846, the territory had no formal prison for several years. 36 In their
petition for statehood, Oregon residents lamented, "We have no
prisons, and no means of punishing many offences, unless we
History andReview ofthe Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 456 (2006).
25. Bodenhamer, supra note 13, at 365.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 367.
29. Id. at 369-70.
30. Id at 370.
31. Id.
32. Id at 371.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Leslie M. Scott, Oregon's ProvisionalGovernment, 1843-49, 30 OR. HIST. Q. 207,
216 (1929).
36. Ward M. McAfee, The Formation of Prison-ManagementPhilosophy in Oregon,
1843-1915, 91 OR. HIST. Q. 258, 259 (1990).
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retrograde to the times of the branding iron, the cropping knife and
the whipping post; and this would be revolting to the moral sense of
our community." 37 In 1857, Oregon adopted a constitution with a
section substantially similar to Article I, Section Eighteen of the
Indiana Constitution. There is no record of any debate or discussion
about what would become Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon
Constitution.38 However, the Oregon Supreme Court has
acknowledged that former Article I, Section Fifteen was inspired by
Indiana's constitution. 39 Oregon courts have repeatedly acknowledged
Indiana's influence on other parts of the Oregon Constitution.4 0
Rehabilitation eventually fell into disfavor during the twentieth
century for several reasons. 41 First, critics of the rehabilitative model
argued that the very idea of rehabilitation was classist. 4 2 They felt that

a biased justice system would always find that middle and upper class
defendants would require less rehabilitation than poor defendants,
even if the wealthy defendants' crimes hurt society more. 43 Second,
they argued that the rehabilitative model gave excessive power to
judges to formulate sentences even though they had no special insight
into what kinds of punishments would really promote reform.44
Finally, they argued that rehabilitation simply had not worked, even
when programs were well-conceived and well-financed.45 Some of
the harshest critics of the rehabilitative model were liberals, whom
one might expect to favor "considerations of generosity and charity,
compassion and love" 4 6 that the rehabilitative model potentially
incorporates into sentencing decisions.

37. Priscilla Knuth et al., Oregon Territory in 1849-1850, 40 PAC. NORTHWEST Q. 3, 7
(1949).
38. Claudia Burton & Andrew Grade, A Legislative History of the Oregon Constitution
ofl857-Partl(Articlesland[l), 37 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 469, 527-28 (2001).
39. State v. Finch, 103 P. 505, 512 (Or. 1909) ("we find that the section in question was
substantially copied from the Constitution of the state of Indiana.").
40. See, e.g., Priest v. Pearce, 840 P.2d 65, 68 (Or. 1992) (discussing OR. CONST. art. 1,
§ 14); State v. Cookman, 920 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Or. 1996) (discussing OR. CONST. art. 1, § 21).
41. Michael Vitiello, ReconsideringRehabilitation,65 TUL. L. REv. 1011, 1021 (1990).
42. Id
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1052.
45. See id at 1025.
46. Id. at 1024.
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III. ARTICLE I, SECTION EIGHTEEN OF THE INDIANA CONSTITUTION
AND FORMER ARTICLE I, SECTION FIFTEEN OF THE OREGON
CONSTITUTION JURISPRUDENCE

This Part considers Indiana's and Oregon's jurisprudence as it
relates to (1) capital punishment, (2) length of imprisonment, (3)
prison conditions, (4) procedural issues, and (5) miscellaneous issues.
Over a century-and-a-half of decisions have made clear that Indiana
and Oregon appellate courts rendered Article I, Section Eighteen of
the Indiana Constitution and former Article I, Section Fifteen of the
Oregon Constitution dead letter.
A. CapitalPunishment
Indiana reformers seized on Article I, Section Eighteen of the
Indiana Constitution to argue for ending capital punishment. In early
1852, only months after Indiana voters ratified the new constitution,
state representative Oliver Torbet spoke passionately in favor of a bill
to substitute life imprisonment for the death penalty.4 7 Torbet argued
that the main object of punishment was reform of the offender.
"Strange method of accomplishing the reformation of the offender,"
Torbet observed, "to kill him!" 4 8 Torbet's argument ultimately failed
to move the state legislature. But the challenge to capital punishment
under Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution shortly
moved to the courts.
In Driskill v. State,4 9 a man convicted of first-degree murder
challenged his death sentence under the Article I, Section Eighteen. In
rejecting his appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court made several
interesting claims about Article I, Section Eighteen. First, the court
claimed that the death penalty itself, at least for crimes such as firstdegree murder is not vindictive, but retributive.5 0 Second, the court
declared that the most important purpose of punishment is to protect
society, not reform criminals. 5 1 Third, the court implied that even if
rehabilitation is the primary purpose of punishment, it is still
acceptable for an individual sentence not to promote rehabilitation so
47. Remarks of Oliver B. Torbet, DAILY ST. SENTINEL (Indianapolis) (Mar. 13, 1852),
https://newspapers.library.in.gov/cgi-bin/indiana?a=d&d=DSS 8520313-01.1.2&srpos=
4&e-- 85-en-20-1-txt-txlN-%22principles+of+reformation%22-.
48. Id.
49. 7 Ind. 338 (1855).
50. Seeid.at343.
51. Id. ("The main object of all punishment is the protection of society.")
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long as the entire penal code does. 52 This would seem to preclude
individual challenges to sentences since the prosecution could always
reply that the penal code in its entirety promotes rehabilitation.
Moreover, it is unclear what proportion of the penal code has to
promote rehabilitation versus other goals. If 51% of the sentences in
the penal code promote rehabilitation, and the other 49% promote
deterrence, incapacitation, or retribution, can the state say that it has
complied with Article I, Section Eighteen? Since 1855, Indiana courts
have consistently rejected the argument that capital punishment
violates Article I, Section Eighteen. 5 3
Of course, capital punishment is not necessarily incompatible
with what is likely the original understanding of Article I, Section
Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution. As noted previously, at
Indiana's 1851 constitution convention, delegates rejected a proposal
to ban capital punishment. 54 Thus, those who drafted and approved
Indiana's constitution could not have understood Article I, Section
Eighteen to forbid capital punishment. Diskill could have affirmed
capital punishment by making this narrow claim. Or, after considering
the crime's circumstances and the offender's background, Driskill
could have invoked the absurdity canon55 or similar principles and
held that it would be ridiculous to punish the particular offender in
that case with an eye toward reformation when he was so dangerous
and violent that the main concern in the specific case at hand had to
be protecting society. Later the same year in Rice v. State56 for
example, the Indiana Supreme Court declared that there are some
criminals "whose necks have become so hardened 'that they should
suddenly be cut off, and that without remedy."'5 7 Notably, however,
Driskillwent much further and explained that the main concern of all

52. See id. ("With that end in view, the legislature have, in a given case, left it within the
discretion of the jury to say when the death penalty shall be inflicted. It is true, one branch of
that discretion does not contemplate reform; still, it is the only instance in the law in which the
purpose of reformation is not prominent, and it cannot, it seems to us, be allowed to give
character to the principles upon which the entire code is founded.")
53. See, e.g., Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 2004); Smith v. State, 465 N.E.2d
1105, 1113 (Ind. 1984).
54. Bodenhamer, supra note 13, at 371.
55. Courts have invoked the absurdity canon when interpreting constitutional provisions.
See, e.g., Abrams v. Lamone, 398 Md. 146, 187 (2007) ("neither it nor logic demands that we
so broadly interpret a constitutional provision as to make that provision 'absurd or
unworkable.') (internal quotation omitted).
56. 7 Ind. 332 (1855).
57. 1d. at 337.
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punishments under the constitution was in fact incapacitation, and that
courts need not craft sentences to reform offenders in individual
cases. 58
Interestingly, one Indiana judge in 1857 even argued that the
prospect of capital punishment could facilitate reform by persuading a
person to accept responsibility for his crimes and recommit to God. In
sentencing a defendant to death for murdering his wife, the judge
asked "are you prepared to stand before that All-Seeing Judge, seated
upon the Throne of Eternal Justice, and declare your innocence? If
not.. .prostrate yourself before the Mercy Seat, and implore the
interposition of the Divine Redeemer." 59 Though this sounds strange
to modern ears, it is consistent with the way many Americans during
the colonial understood capital punishment-that is, they believed
capital punishment could rehabilitate a criminal's soul. 60 To ensure

that a prisoner's soul was saved, colonial jurisdictions often permitted
the condemned to attend church if there was a scheduled service
before the execution and even to pick the Bible passage preached
during the sermon. 6 1 There is some evidence that Indiana residents in
the 1850s had similar expectations of capital punishment. A
newspaper article covering Driskill's and Rice's executions
extensively documented their interactions with clergy members
during their final hours and expressed dismay that the impending
executions had not caused them to manifest "any signs of penitence,"
or to confess their guilt. 62

Today, viewing Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution through such an explicitly Christian theological lens-as
many colonial Americans viewed capital punishment-would likely
cause First Amendment challenges under the Establishment Clause.
Possibly for that reason, decisions involving death penalty challenges

.

58. Driskill, 7 Ind. at 343. Indiana courts have often reiterated the principle that Article 1,
Section Eighteen challenges can only be made to the penal code as a whole. See, e.g., Smith v.
State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1272 (Ind. 1997); Conrad v. State, 747 N.E.2d 575, 584 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001).
59. Sentence of Death, TERRE HAUTE DAILY UNION (Oct. 24, 1857),
https://newspapers.library.in.gov/cgi-bin/indiana?a-d&d=THDU 18571024.1.2&srpos=
-en-20-1-txt-txN-%22throne+of+etemal+justice%223&e60. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 16 (Harvard

University Press 2002).
61. Id. at 19.
62. Hanging of the Three Culprits, CRAWFORDSVILLE WKLY. J. (Jan. 17, 1856),
https://newspapers.library.in.gov/cgi-bin/indiana?a=d&d=CWJ 18560117.1.2&srpos=1 &een-20-1-txt-txfN-%22Driskill%22
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based on Article I, Section Eighteen have not argued that capital
punishment could rehabilitate an offender's soul. 63 This is true even

of Diskill, which explicitly acknowledged that rehabilitation was not
capital punishment's purpose. 64
Like the defendant in Driskill, the defendant in Finch argued that
the death penalty was unconstitutional under former Article I, Section
Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution. 65 As in Diskill, the Finch court
rejected the argument. It found capital punishment consistent with
former Article I, Section Fifteen for three reasons. First, Finch found
that the original understanding of Article I, Section Fifteen was that it
permitted capital punishment. 66 Finch noted that five future Oregon
Supreme Court members were delegates to Oregon's 1857
constitution, and that they at various points all either sentenced
defendants to death, or affirmed death sentences. 67 Moreover, Finch
observed that legislatures sitting after the constitution's ratification
did not abolish capital punishment, and, in fact, explicitly
reauthorized the death penalty. 68 Second, Finch concluded that capital
punishment was consistent with former Article I, Section Fifteen
because another section of the constitution authorized the governor to
grant reprieves in death penalty cases. 69 The governor could only
have the power to grant reprieves under the Oregon Constitution, the
court reasoned, if that constitution contemplated the death penalty's
existence. 7 0 Therefore, capital punishment could not violate former
Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution. Finally, Finch
noted that former Article I, Section Fifteen was taken from Article I,
Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution. 7 1 Since by 1857,
Indiana courts had already construed Article I, Section Eighteen of
the Indiana Constitution not to prohibit capital punishment, delegates
63. E.g., Saylor v. State, 686 N.E.2d 80, 88 (Ind. 1997).
64. Driskill v. State, 7 Ind. 338, 343 (1855) ("The main object of all punishment is the
protection of society. With that end in view, the legislature have, in a given case, left it within
the discretion of the jury to say when the death penalty shall be inflicted. It is true, one branch
of that discretion does not contemplate reform; still, it is the only instance in the law in which
the purpose of reformation is not prominent, and it can not, it seems to us, be allowed to give
character to the principles upon which the entire code is founded.").
65. State v. Finch, 103 P. 505, 511 (Or. 1909).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 511-12.
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at Oregon's 1857 constitutional convention must have meant to adopt
that construction.72
In the modem era, some jurists have questioned whether capital
punishment is consistent with Article I, Section Eighteen of the
Indiana Constitution and former Article I, Section Fifteen of the
Oregon Constitution. For example, in his dissent in Adams v. State,73
Justice DeBruler effectively argued for overturning prior decisions
such as Driskli and forbidding Indiana from imposing the death
sentence for first-degree murder. Taking issue with the Driskill
court's assertion that the death penalty was "even-handed justice,"
Justice DeBruler instead described it as based on the philosophy of
"an eye for an eye," which he found a vindictive principle of law.74
Moreover, Justice DeBruler rejected Rice's75 argument that courts
could treat some defendants as beyond redemption. In his view,
Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution required that a
sentence not foreclose "all possibility of reformation of the
offender." 7 6 Interestingly, Justice DeBruler also claimed that a life
sentence for first-degree murder would comport with Article I,
Section Eighteen. A life sentence would necessarily only promote
rehabilitation in that it might give a prisoner the time and space to
contemplate the crimes committed and change character; it would not
reform the prisoner for the purpose of eventually returning to society.
That is, rehabilitation need not give a criminal a second chance to live
as a free person as long as it always gives the chance to become a
better person.
B. Prisontenns
1. Life imprisonment
Attempts to use Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution and former Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon

72. Id. at 512.
73. Adams v. State, 271 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ind. 1971) (DeBruler, J., dissenting), vacated,
284 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. 1972) (vacating in light of the intervening opinion in Furman v. Georgia,
405 U.S. 238 (1972)).
74. Id. at 432 ("This would be the same as claiming that the 'eye for an eye' philosophy
is not vindictive, when in fact it is the epitome of vindictiveness and revengefulness. The
exclusive use of the 'eye for an eye' philosophy is precisely what is precluded by § 18.").
75. Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 332 (1855).
76. Adams, 271 N.E.2d at 432 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
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Constitution to receive lesser prison sentences have almost always
failed. In Tuel v. Gladden, decided in 1963, the petitioner received a
life sentence without parole under the Habitual Criminal Act 78
because of three prior offenses.79 Oregon's governor had previously
commuted the petitioner's original sentence in 1940, but the
commutation was revoked later when the petitioner violated the
commutation's terms.8 0 The petitioner received another commutation
in 1954, but then it was revoked after again violating the
commutation's terms.8 ' The trial court granted the petitioner collateral
relief after finding that the Habitual Criminal Act under which the
petitioner was sentenced violated former Article I, Section Fifteen of
the Oregon Constitution. 82 The Oregon Supreme Court reversed. 83
The Court defined reformationand vindictive.84 It even went so far as
to declare that life imprisonment without parole was inconsistent with
reformation.8 5

So how did the Tuel court escape the logical conclusion that the
petitioner's life sentence violated former Article I, Section Fifteen? It
found, as Driskilihad, that the most important purpose of punishment
was in fact the protection of society-the text of former Article I,
Section Fifteen notwithstanding. 86 Tuel granted that sentencing laws
needed to seek reformation and that they could not be used to
retaliate. 87 Importantly, however, the state had no obligation to reform
offenders if the attempt to do so put society at risk.8 8 A life sentence

78. Or. Laws 1927, ch. 334, § 4.
79. 379 P.2d 553, 554 (Or. 1963).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 557.
84. Id at 555 ("Reformation means doing over to bring about a better result, correction,
or rectification. Vindictive, on the other hand, is defined by words such as 'revenge,'
'retaliate,' or 'punishment.' The best known law applying vindictive justice is lex talionis: 'An
eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.' Matthew 5:38").
85. Id. ("It has been suggested that life confinement is not inconsistent with reformation,
i.e., the person might be reformed, but, nevertheless, his confinement would be continued.
That view, we believe, is contrary to an implied essential corollary of reformation, that
permanent reformation should be followed by release from confinement.").
86. Id. ("The drafters of the constitution, however, did not include the most important
consideration of all, the protection and safety of the people of the state. Such a principle does
not have to be expressed in the constitution as it is the reason for criminal law. All jurisdictions
recognize its overriding importance.").
8 7. Id
8 8. Id.
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under the Habitual Criminal Act was therefore permissible under
former Article I, Section Fifteen because focusing exclusively on
reforming an offender who has committed four felonies so he can
reenter society would be absurd because of how improbable it was
that someone with his history would actually reform. 89
Indiana courts have likewise found that a life sentence without
parole does not violate Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution when imposed in cases of aggravated murder. 90 This is
even true in the case of juveniles, when one might expect
rehabilitation to play the biggest role in punishment. In Conley v.
State, the defendant was seventeen when he murdered his younger
brother.91 It was a gruesome crime92 perpetrated by an individual with
mental illness. 93 Despite the fact that this case was the first time the
Indiana Supreme Court had considered whether life without parole for
juvenile offenders violated the Indiana Constitution, it concluded that
it did not violate Article I, Section Eighteen without any explicit
analysis of the provision. 94
2. Habitual Offender Laws
Habitual offender laws subject defendants to harsher punishment
because of previous offenses. 9 5 In Funk v. State, the defendant was
convicted of theft and received a two-year sentence on that charge. 96
As a habitual offender, he received an additional thirty years. 97 The
court concluded that its analysis determining that the defendant's

89. See id at 556 ("However, the odds of true and permanent reformation of one who
has already committed four felonies are so outweighed by the odds that a four-time repeater
will continue to be a menace to a community if he is released from his confinement that the
obligation to protect the people of this state justifies the passage of a compulsory life sentence
for a four-time felon.").
90. See, e.g., Fryback v. State, 400 N.E.2d 1128, 1133-34 (Ind. 1980) (collecting cases).
91. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 869 (Ind. 2012).
92. The defendant put his brother in a headlock until he passed out, choked him for
around 20 minutes after that, placed a black plastic bag over his brother's face, and finally
slammed his brother's face into concrete three times. Id. at 870.
93. Id. at 888 (Rucker, J., dissenting) ("As the trial court noted in its sentencing order,
'All [diagnosing medical experts] agree that the Defendant suffered from a mental disease at
the time of the murder."') (quoting the trial transcript).
94. See id. at 869-81 (majority opinion).
95. See, e.g., Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Stnkes Laws Make Sense?
HabitualOffender Statutes and CrminalIncapacitation,87 GEO. L.J. 103, 110-12 (1998).
96. Funk v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1081, 1083 (Ind. 1981).
97. Id
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sentence under the habitual offender statute 98 was not cruel and
unusual also demonstrated that the act did not violate Article I,
Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution. 99
The Oregon Supreme Court initially rejected the argument that
Oregon's Habitual Criminal Actloo contravened former Article I,
Section Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution in just one sentence. o1
Tuel provided more analysis. Similar to Driskill, Tuel found that
protection of society was the most important purpose of punishment,
despite the language of former Article I, Section Fifteen, since the
"Oregon Constitution does not attempt to state all of the principles to
be followed by the legislature in enacting sentencing laws."' 02 Indiana
courts have consistently held that habitual offender laws do not
violate Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution' 03 and
Oregon courts have done likewise with former Article I, Section
Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution.104
3. Mandatory Minimums
Defendants have also unsuccessfully argued that mandatory
minimums violate the provisions. In State v. Reams, the Oregon
Court of Appeals reasoned that if the death penalty-which
definitively prevents an offender's reformation and return to
society-was constitutional under former Article I, Section Fifteen, a
mandatory minimum of twenty-five years for aggravated murder
05
certainly was too.s
An Indiana appeals court upheld mandatory
minimum jail sentences for juveniles caught possessing handguns
without explicitly considering Article I, Section Eighteen of the
Indiana Constitution.1 0 6

98. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-8 (1979).
99. Funk, 427 N.E.2d at 1086-87.
100. Or. Laws 1947, ch. 585, p. 1101.
101. State v. Hicks, 325 P.2d 794, 799 (Or. 1958) ("There is no merit in the contention
that the habitual criminal law, as such, violates the provisions of Article I, § 15 of the Oregon
Constitution. . .").
102. Tuel v. Gladden, 379 P.2d 553, 555 (Or. 1963).
103. See, e.g., Wise v. State, 400 N.E.2d 114, 117-18 (Ind. 1980); Person v. State, 764
N.E.2d 743, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
104. Hicks, 325 P.2d at 799.
105. State v. Reams, 616 P.2d 498, 505 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); see also State v. Jackson,
929 P.2d 323, 327 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Spinney, 820 P.2d 854, 856 (Or. Ct. App.
1991); State v. Oslund, 693 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
106. Person v. State, 661 N.E.2d 587, 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
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4. Parole
Courts have also not accepted the argument that Oregon and
Indiana's constitutional goal of reformation requires an opportunity
for parole. In Huggins v. Indiana ParoleBoard, Huggins filed a civil
complaint against the parole board after it denied his request for
parole. 107 He submitted his record of education, work performance,
and counseling to show that he had been reformed.10 8 Huggins argued
that since he was demonstrably reformed, Article I, Section Eighteen
of the Indiana Constitution required his parole. 109 The parole board
considered the following criteria: "(1) nature and circumstances of the
crime for which the offender is committed; (2) offender's prior
criminal record; (3) offender's conduct and attitude during the
commitment; and (4) offender's parole plan.""'o Huggins argued that
the board should consider his reformation above all else.' The court
found that the other factors were permissible in considering parole
and drew upon an Indiana Supreme Court case explaining that the
legislature could permissibly abolish parole.1 12 Interestingly, the court
seems to have accepted that Huggins was in fact reformed, implying
that the purpose of promulgating the penal code-reformation-was
accomplished in his case.
As with the death penalty, there was some modest pushback. In
Shumway v. State, concurring Justice Tanzer argued that a mandatory
sentence of life without some possibility of parole for murder in
individual cases sentence offended former Article I, Section Fifteen of
the Oregon Constitution." 3 In many ways however, Justice Tanzer's
concurrence is remarkable for how narrow a construction it would
have given that section. Justice Tanzer accepted that it applied only to
statutes as a whole and not individual sentences, and did not create
individual rights, in the same way Oregon's bill of rights' other
sections do."14 So long as a sentencing statute, "in its classification of
crimes, in its penalty provisions, or in the way the penalties are to be
administered, [must omitted] provide[s] in some manner for the

107. Huggins v. Ind. Parole Bd., 605 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).

108. Id. at 230.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id. (citing White v. State, 330 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Ind. 1975)).
State v. Shumway, 630 P.2d 796, 808 (Or. 1981) (Tanzer, J., concurring).
Id. at 806-07.
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possibility of individual reformation," it passes constitutional muster.
Nonetheless, an offender did need an opportunity to receive parole.
However, Oregon courts have not adopted his view." 5
C Prison Conditions
In both Indiana and Oregon, concerned citizens, politicians, and
prison administrators have cited former Article I, Section Fifteen of
the Oregon Constitution and Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution as a mandate to improve penal conditions. In 1859, the
Indiana legislature passed a resolution authorizing a committee to
better understand "the almost uniform failure to secure the
reformation of convicts; and to investigate the best means of
conforming the system to the requirements of the Constitution
[Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution]." 1 l6 To
prevent juveniles from being "thrown into a cell with an old
experienced offender" and coming out a "graduate in crime," the
Indiana legislature in 1903 provided that those between sixteen and
thirty years old would go to a reformatory instead of the state
prison. 117 The new reformatory provided instruction in trades to
furnish young offenders with skills."

8

In 1902, an Oregon prison administrator cited former Article I,
Section Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution as the reason he allowed
more religious services on Sundays and worked to increase the
number of prison library books."l 9 He also proposed conditional
parole for well-behaved inmates and a night school for prisoners'
education.1 20 A gubernatorial candidate in Oregon's 1914 election

.

115. See, e.g, State v. Oslund, 693 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Or. Ct. App. 1985); Norris v.
Cupp, 678 P.2d 756, 758 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
116. Indiana Legislature, DAILY SENTINEL (Indianapolis)
(Mar. 7. 1859),
https://newspapers.library.in.gov/cgi-bin/indiana?a=d&d=DSS18590307-01.1.3&srpos=
10&e185-en-20-1-txt-txlN-%22princioles+of+refonation%22117. Will H. Whittaker, Reform of Criminals, INDIANAPOLIS J. (Oct. 26, 1903),
https://newspapers.1ibrary.in.gov/cgi-bin/indiana?a=d&d=1J19031026.1.7&srpos=5&e-en-20-1-txt-txlN-%22principles+of+reformation%22+AND+%22reformatory%2211 8. Id.
119. J.D. Lee, Letter to the Editor, To Help the Prisoners-ID.Lee Favors Conditional
Parole for Good Behavior, MORNING OREGONIAN (Portland) (Nov. 05, 1902), http://oregon
news.uoregon.edu/iccn/sn8302 5138/1902-11-05/ed-I /seq-7/#index=1 3&rows=20&words
=justice+vindictive&sequence=0&proxtext=%22vindictive+justice%22&y=0&x=0&dateFilter
Type=range&page=l.
120. Id
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answered a question about his criminal justice platform, explaining, "I
think the spirit of this section [former Article I, Section Fifteen of the
Oregon Constitution] should be carried out, prisoners treated
humanely and given an opportunity, if they are not unregenerate, to
become once again useful and honorable citizens." 1 2 ' However,
whenever prisoners have invoked their respective sections to argue
for different prison conditions on appeal, they have not succeeded.
This is unsurprising, especially under Oregon's former Article I,
Section Fifteen. A department of corrections policy is certainly not a
"law[] for the punishment of crime." 1 2 2
1. Rehabilitation programing
Prisoners have also been largely unsuccessful in arguing that
these constitutional sections required treatment programs for
prisoners' reformation. In Kent v. Cupp, habeas petitioner Kent had
received an indeterminate life sentence for sex offenses.1 2 3 After
participating in sex offender treatment programs and other treatment
programs for years, his participation in group therapy was
terminated. 12 4 He attempted to get into a treatment program at the
Oregon State Hospital, but was denied because he was not mentally
ill. 125 Kent asked the court to either order the prison to provide him
with rehabilitation programs (which would aid his parole case) or
release him.' 2 6 The majority refused, holding that it had no authority
to order that rehabilitation programs be made available.1 2 7 Judge Fort
vigorously dissented, arguing that former Article I, Section Fifteen
required the Oregon Department of Corrections to make reasonable
efforts to provide suitable rehabilitation programs. 12 8
Similarly, in Manley v. State, an inmate had received a total
fifty-five year prison sentence for child molestation. 12 9 He argued that

121. Queries Answered By Six Aspirants, SUNDAY OREGONIAN (Portland) (Apr. 12.
1914), http://oregonnews.uoregon.edu/lccn/sn83045782/1914-04-12/ed-1/seq-16/#index=2&
22
&y=0
rows=20&words=Justice+vindictive&sequence=0&proxtext-%22vindictive+justice%
&x=0&dateFilterType=range&page=2.
122. OR. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (amended 1996).
123. Kent v. Cupp, 554 P.2d 196, 197 (Or. Ct. App. 1976).
124. Id
125. Id
126. Id at 198.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 200 (Fort, J., dissenting).
129. Manley v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1175, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
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the Indiana Department of Correction violated Article I, Section
Eighteen by not offering all of the rehabilitative services
recommended for him.' 30 At the time of the case, the state did not
offer even one of the recommended sex-offender rehabilitation
programs.1 3 1 The Department's policy was to offer a specific sexoffender program at one particular facility and for sex offenders to
complete it within three years before their projected release date.1 32
The court found the policy reasonable because an inmate's
participation in the program close to his release date would maximize
the program's impact.' 33 The court rejected the inmate's argument
that refusing his participation at present was vindictive. 134
2. Juveniles incarcerated with adults
In Hunter v. State,135 the Indiana Supreme Court 36 assessed
whether incarcerating a juvenile offender convicted of burglary and
murder with adults violated Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution. The court explained in some depth why confining a
juvenile offender in an adult prison in this particular case was
consistent with the intent of the drafters of Article I, Section
Eighteen.1 37 Although the court did not explicitly invoke a standard of
review in applying the section, the opinion's tone suggests that it is
quite deferential. 138 As in Driskill, the court held that a legislative
sentencing scheme could comply with Article I, Section Eighteen if it
generally promoted reform even if it did not do so in a specific
case.1 39

130. Id. at 1178.
131. Id.
132. Id
133. Id.
134. See id. at 1178-79.
135. Hunter v. State, 676 N.E.2d 14 (Ind. 1996); see also Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d
530 (1998).
136. 1 have not found an Oregon case confronting a similar issue and legal challenge.
137. See Hunter, 676 N.E.2d at 16.
138. Id at 17 ("We find it well within the legislature's purview to conclude that this
system better accommodates the purposes behind Article 1, § 18 and Article 9, § 2, because it
segregates younger and less violent offenders from the most violent offenders, regardless of
age.").
139. Id. ("The legislature has not frustrated this intent by setting up a statutory scheme
that prohibits most youths from being confined to an adult correctional facility. The only
youths who are not subject to this general rule are youths alleged to have committed the most
serious and violent crimes.").
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D. ProceduralChallenges
Inmates have challenged various judicial procedures as being
inconsistent with Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution.
1. Jury Instructions
In Emory v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision to exclude a jury instruction that verdicts cannot be
based on a desire to punish.1 40 Such an instruction, the court
explained, "is simply not a correct statement of law." 1 4 1 In Baird v.
State, another defendant convicted of first-degree murder request a
reference to Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution in
the jury instructions during the trial's penalty phase. 14 2 This time, the
court claimed that this was a correct statement of law-unlike in
Emory-but nonetheless affirmed the refusal to give the instruction
because Article I, Section Eighteen "seems to be addressed to
lawmaking bodies" 4 3 and would likely only confuse a jury.1 44
2. Time Limits on Requesting Suspended Sentence
A petitioner convicted of deviate conduct and who had received
a fifty year prison sentence challenged time limits on filing a petition
as contrary to Article I, Section Eighteen. 14 5 Initially, the trial court
granted Schweitzer's petition to reduce her sentence to twenty
years.1 46 However, it vacated the reduction because Schweitzer filed
the petition more than 180 days after she began serving her sentence,
and did not obtain the prosecutor's consent, as required for petitions
filed after the deadline. 147 An Indiana appeals court rejected her
argument that a time limit on petitions for sentence reduction violated

140. Emory v. State, 420 N.E.2d 883 (Ind. 1981).
141. Id. at 886.
142. Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1992).
143. Id. at 1179.
144. Id
145. Schweitzer v. State, 700 N.E.2d 488, 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), superseded by
statute, IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17(b) (West 2018), as recognizedin Johnson v. State, 36 N.E.3d
1130, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (relating to timing of prosecuting attorney opposing sentence
modification).
146. Id
14 7. Id
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Article I, Section Eighteen, explaining that rehabilitation did not
require unfettered access to sentence reduction.1 4 8
E. Miscellaneous Challenges

Defendants and prisoners have invoked former Article I, Section
Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution and Article I, Section Eighteen of
the Indiana Constitution to challenge various other aspects of
Oregon's and Indiana's justice systems.
1. Vague Statute
In State v. Wojahn, Oregon indicted the defendant for negligent
homicide. 1 49 The relevant part of the statute read:

*

When the death of any person ensues within one year
as the proximate result of injuries caused by the
driving of any motor vehicle in a negligent manner,
* * the person so driving such vehicle * * * is guilty

of negligent homicide, and, upon conviction, shall be
.punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than one year, or in the state penitentiary for not
more than three years, or by a fine of not to exceed
$2,500, or by both fine and imprisonment.15 0
The trial court dismissed the indictment, but the Oregon
Supreme Court reversed. 15' The defendant argued that convicting him
under the statute violated former Article I, Section Fifteen, because
the statute failed to give him sufficient notice of what constituted
negligent driving. 15 2 Since the statute did not clearly explain what
negligent driving was, he reasoned, he could not know what
improvements he had to make and thus the statute would fail to
reform him.1 5 3 The court rejected the argument because any
reasonable person who killed someone while driving would know
how to improve driving in the future.1 54 Moreover, the court reasoned
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 491.
State v. Wojahn, 282 P.2d 675, 677 (Or. 1955).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 702.
Seeid.
See id.
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that since capital punishment did not violate former Article I, Section
Fifteen, neither could the punishment a defendant received for
negligent homicide.

55

2. Driving Privileges
In Hazelwood v. State, a man asked an Indiana trial court to
rescind his lifetime driving ban.1 56 The court cited a provision
requiring a person seeking reinstatement of driving privileges to show
that he had not been convicted of driving while privileges were
revoked for life and denied his request. 157 On appeal, he argued that
the provision contravened Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution because its purpose was necessarily not rehabilitative. 58
An Indiana appeals court did not engage with the argument and held
only that Article I, Section Eighteen did not allow as-applied
challenges.'

59

3. Adoption
An incarcerated father drew upon former Article I, Section
Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution to challenge a family court's order
allowing his minor son to be adopted.1 60 A statute allowed an
adoption decree to issue if the parent was incarcerated for three years
or more and adoption was in the child's best interest.' 6 1 The father
argued that the statute violated former Article I, Section Fifteen of the
Oregon Constitution because the adoption of his child could in no
way plausibly help rehabilitate him.1 62 The appeals court rejected the
argument, finding that the statute allowing adoption was not a "law
for the punishment of crime."' 63 Instead, the statute was a device to
improve the minor child's living situation.1 64 The court intimated that
the statute could be used vindictively (though without expressly
stating whether this would offend former Article I, Section Fifteen),
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
1996)).
164.

Id.
Hazlewood v. State, 3 N.E.3d 39, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
Id.
Id at 42.
Id.
Stursa v. Kyle, 782 P.2d 158 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
Id. at 159.
Id
Id. (quoting (without citation) the language of OR. CONST. art. 1,
Id. at 160.

§

15 (amended

CONS TITUTIONALIZING REHABILITATION

2 018 ]

29 1

but concluded that there was no such use in the present case.165
Notably, this was in some tension with the Oregon Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Grady In Grady, a county welfare commission
terminated the petitioner's parental rights after she was imprisoned
for violating her probation's terms. 166 The supreme court reversed.167
It cited as justification for its conclusion the "salutary provision" of
former Article I, Section Fifteen:
What better inducement can she have for redemption
than the assurance that she may have again her little
girls in one united family? What a devastating blow to
self-improvement if this young person, who,
according to her own mother, yearned for affection
and felt left out in her own family, to learn that she is
to be forever separated from her little ones after
satisfying the penalty of imprisonment. To destroy the
great human tie between her and those she bore
would, under the circumstances present here,
approximate a species of unintended vindictive justice
which might well undo all of the reformation expected
from her present incarceration. 168
While Grady possibly reflects a desire to give effect to the
provision, Stursa reflects how little weight Oregon courts have
actually given it.
Signs of Life?
The overall thrust of the cases discussed above would indicate
that these constitutional sections are dead at the appellate level. In
Indiana however, the doctrine of amelioration suggests that Article I,
Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution is alive on appellate
review-albeit on life support.
In Dowdell v. State, the trial court originally sentenced Dowdell
to not less than ten years, nor more than twenty-five for robbery.1 69 In
seeking post-conviction relief, he argued that the minimum sentence
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id
State v. Grady, 371 P.2d 68 (Or. 1962).
Id. at 70.

Id.
Dowdell v. State, 336 N.E.2d 699, 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
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should have been five years, pursuant to a statute enacted three days
before his sentencing. 170 The general rule in Indiana is that the statute
in place at the time a crime was committed determines the
sentence.' 7 1 The court of appeals found that an exception to this
general rule applied if the legislature intended a new statute to have
an ameliorative effect.1 72 In cases where there was
an express statement by the legislature that its former
penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment
is proper as punishment for the commission of the
proscribed act, then to hold that the more severe
penalty should apply would serve no purpose other
than to satisfy a constitutionally impermissible desire
for vindictive justice. We could not ascribe to the
legislature an intent to punish for vindictive
purposes.173

Though the court found the amendment not to be ameliorative in
this case and therefore affirmed the trial court,1 74 the opinion saw the
nascence of the doctrine of amelioration.
The Indiana Supreme Court acknowledged the doctrine of
amelioration in Watford v. State 7 5 and Hoisclaw v. State' 76-though
it denied the offenders the benefit of the doctrine in both cases. It
explicitly embraced the doctrine in Richards v. State, where it held
that a convicted rapist originally sentenced to 115 years in prison was
entitled to a maximum sentence of seventy years under a new statute
put in effect before sentencing, but after his crime.177 A substantial
caveat is in order-unlike the court of appeals in Dowdell, the
Richards supreme court made no mention of Article I, Section
Eighteen. The Indiana Supreme Court thus endorses the doctrine of
amelioration, but we do not know if it accepts the court of appeals'

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id. at 702 n.8.
Id. at 702-03.
384 N.E.2d 1030, 1033 (Ind. 1979).
384 N.E.2d 1026, 1030 (Ind. 1979).
Richards v. State, 681 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind. 1997).
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rationale for the doctrine-the rejection of vindictive justice in Article
I, Section Eighteen.
Furthermore, the criteria for an offender to qualify for the
doctrine of amelioration are stringent.' First, there is a narrow time
window for when the doctrine applies-a new statute must go into
effect after a crime was committed, but before sentencing.1 7 9 This
means that a statute with clear ameliorative effect does not apply if
goes into effect after sentencing. 1s Second, the new statute must
either alter the definition of a crime' or shorten the maximum
sentence available for the crime.' 82 Third, the statute must have an
ameliorative effect in all foreseeable cases, and not simply the one
currently before the court.1 83
If the basis for the doctrine of amelioration is indeed Article I,
Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution, then the doctrine's
premise is in significant tension with its requirements. Several
examples illustrate this point. Assume the legislature concludes that a
previous statute for marijuana possession was so harsh for all
offenders that it most likely precluded the possibility of rehabilitation.
If a revised statute went into effect after sentencing, an offender
would be ineligible for the doctrine of amelioration and would
continue to serve time under an old statute Dowdell would label
vindictive based on the legislature's decision to moderate the
sentences in a new statute.' 84 Or assume that same statute reduced the
minimum sentence for those who possessed a small amount of
marijuana for personal consumption to better facilitate rehabilitation
in such cases, but left the maximum intact for large scale distributors.
The recreational offender would likewise be ineligible for the doctrine

178. See, e.g., Winbush v. State, 776 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
179. Id
180. Turner v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
181. Id. at 1027-28.
182. Turner v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
183. Id. ("Consequently, had the amended statute been utilized to sentence Turner under
a Class D felony sentencing scheme, the resulting sentence would have been significantly
shorter than that imposed by the trial court, as a Class D felony carries a maximum penalty of
just three years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-7. However, in another respect, the amended statute is not
ameliorative because a defendant who owes back-support to more than one child must now
have accumulated only a total of $15,000 in arrearages rather than $10,000 for each child.
Consequently, while the amendment may have had an ameliorative effect in Turner's case, the
amendment cannot be said to be truly ameliorative, that is ameliorative under all
circumstances.").
184. Dowdell v. State, 336 N.E. 2d 699, 702 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975).
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of amelioration even though the doctrine would seem applicable in
her circumstances. Because the revised statute does not affect all
cases, an Indiana court would not apply the doctrine of amelioration
to those convicted of possession, even though the legislature itself had
concluded that more leniency was warranted for a small-time
offender. Nevertheless, Indiana offenders have successfully availed
themselves of the doctrine on occasion,18 5 though, many of these
cases do not mention Article I, Section Eighteen as support for their
holdings.1 86 It is therefore unclear to what extent Article I, Section
Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution animates the doctrine of
amelioration, even in Indiana's lower courts.
IV. WHY HAVE COURTS BEEN

So HESITANT TO ENFORCE THESE
SECTIONS?

Neither state's high court has given an offender relief
definitively on the basis of Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution or former Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon
Constitution. What accounts for this hesitancy? I first argue that
though fear of political repercussions for looking soft on crime is a
tempting explanation, it is wrong. I then consider various
jurisprudential explanations and conclude that appellate judges in
Indiana and Oregon have lacked a workable framework to evaluate
challenges under these sections.
A. Assessing PossiblePoliticalMotivations for Decliningto
Invoke Article I, Section Eighteen ofthe Indiana
Constitution andFonnerArticle I, Section Fifteen ofthe
Oregon Constitution.
Perhaps the most tempting explanation for judicial refusal to use
these sections is sensitivity to negative political consequences. Both
Indiana and Oregon use some form of election to select jurists.1 87
185. See, e.g., Cotton v. Ellsworth, 788 N.E.2d 867, 871-72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
(invoking IND. CONST. art. I, §18 as support for decision); Renfroe v. State, 743 N.E.2d 299,
300-01 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
186. See, e.g., Cottingham v. State, 952 N.E.2d 245, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), vacated,
971 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. 2012); Robertson v. State, 860 N.E.2d 621, 625 (Ind. Ct. App.), vacated,
871 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. 2007); Bell v. State, 654 N.E.2d 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
187. See generallyIND. CONST. art. VIl; OR. CONST. art. VII. In Indiana, candidates for
most trial court judgeships compete in contested partisan elections. IND. CODE § 33-33-1-1 to
33-33-92-6 (West 2018) (codifying election procedures, or lack thereof, for trial court judges
in each Indianan county). The governor appoints judges to seats on the Court of Appeals of
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Moreover, the public has demonstrated considerable concern about
rising crime rates in the latter half of the twentieth century."' In the
1960s and 1970s, murder rates doubled and robbery rates tripled. 189
At the same time, high-profile riots took place in many cities. In the
1980s, many believed a crack epidemic was sweeping the inner
cities. 190
As a result, politicians began to enact longer, harsher sentences
for many crimes. By 1991, every state had adopted some form of
mandatory minimum sentencing for certain crimes and Congress
enacted at least twenty new mandatory minimum provisions.191
Elected judges perceived as being too soft on crime faced
consequences. In 1986, Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California
Supreme Court lost her seat. 192 After the death penalty was reinstated,
Bird never voted to affirm a death sentence.1 93 All told, she reversed
sixty-one death sentences. 194 Given that 83% of California voters
supported capital punishment in 1985,195 the year before her defeat, it
was perhaps inevitable that she would face a serious challenge.
Groups opposing her raised more than $5.6 million,1 96 and she
eventually lost by more than two-to-one. 197 Two other California
Indiana and the Indiana Supreme Court from a list of names compiled by a judicial nomination
commission; those judges are then subject to retention elections at the next general election
occurring after two years on the bench. IND. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10-11. If retained, the judges
serve for ten years before they must run in another election. IND. CONST. art. VII, § I1. In
Oregon, all judges run in nonpartisan elections for six year terms, though the governor may fill
vacancies by appointment. OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1, 4.
188. John Hanley,

The Death Penalty, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL

CONTROVERSY 108, 117-18 (Nathaniel Persily et al., eds. 2008).
189. Gary LaFree, Declining Violent Crime Rates in the 1990s: PredictingCrineBooms
andBusts, 25 ANN. REV. Soc. 145, 148 (1999).
190. Beverly Xaviera Watkins et al., Arms Against Illness: Crack Cocaine and Drug
Policy in the United States, 2 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 42, 43 (1998).
191. Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two
Centuries ofConsistentFindings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 75 (2009).
192. Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Counteringthe MajorityDifficulty, 96 VA.
L. REv. 719, 735 (2010).
193. Todd S. Purdum, Opinion, Rose Bird, Once California'sChiefJustice, rs Dead at
63, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/06/us/rose-bird-oncecalifornia-s-chief-justice-is-dead-at-63.html.
19 4. Id.
195. Carol Ann Traut & Craig F. Emmert, Expanding the IntegratedModel ofJudicial
Decision Making The California Justices and Capital Punishment 60 J. POL. 1166, 1168
(1998).
196. Tom Wicker, In the Nation; A Naked Power Grab, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1986),
http://www.nytimes.com/1 986/09/14/opinion/in-the-nation-a-naked-power-grab.html.
197. Maura Dolan, Ex-ChiefJustice Rose Bird Dies ofCancerat 63, L.A. TIMES (Dec.
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justices lost their seats, also largely due to their opposition to capital
punishment.1 98 Likewise, Justice Penny White became the first
supreme court justice in Tennessee to lose her retention election. 199 In
1996, she voted with the majority to overturn a convicted rapist and
murderer's death sentence and remand for resentencing. 200 A
campaign against White focused on that single decision, leading to
her defeat. 201
Bird's and White's cases illustrate that a state's methods of
judicial selection can influence how judges behave when reviewing
sentences. A 2015 Reuters' study found that in states where supreme
court justices were appointed, they reverse 26% of death sentences.202
Directly elected justices by contrast reversed just 11% of death
sentence cases.2 03 Justices in hybrid systems where jurists are
appointed and then subject to a retention election reversed 15% of
death sentences.2 04
Judges have gone to great lengths in campaigns to show they are
tough on crime. When three Tennessee Supreme Court justices faced
stiff reelection competition, the opponents' campaigns prominently
featured a death sentence the court had reversed.20 5 Justice Gary
Wade admitted to conducting polling showing that 70% of
Tennesseans supported capital punishment.20 6 An advertisement
advocating the justices' reelection informed viewers that the justices
had in fact affirmed almost 90% of death sentences. 207
This all suggests an obvious explanation for why appellate
judges in Indiana and Oregon have refused to enforce Article I,
Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution and former Article I,
5, 1999), http://articles.Iatimes.com/1 999/dec/05/news/mn-40743/2.
198. Jeffrey D. Kubik & John R. Moran, Lethal Elections: GubernatorialElections and
the Timing ofExecutions, 46 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6 (2003).
199. Id.
200. Georgiana Vines, Where Are They Now: Election Loss Led to Success in
Academia ForFormer TN JusticePenny White, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Sept. 6, 2014),
http://www.knoxnews.com/entertainment/life/where-are-they-now-election-loss-led-tosuccess-in-academia-for-forner-tn-justice-penny-white-ep-596-354313321 .html.
201. Id.
202. Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, In States with Elected High Court Judges, A Harder
Line on Capital Punishment, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com
/investigates/special-report/usa-deathpenalty-judges/.
203. Id.
204. Id.
2 0 5. Id.
2 0 6. Id.
207. Id.
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Section Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution: doing so would make
them appear "soft on crime" and put their seats at risk. Yet this does
not explain why neither state's appellate courts has invalidated a
sentence based on these sections for two reasons. First, appellate
decisions effectively nullifying these sections significantly predate
any "tough on crime" movement. Driskill, discussed above, neutered
Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution only four years
after the section was ratified, in 1855. Furthermore, the delegates to
Indiana's 1851 constitutional convention were popularly elected, and
voters ratified the final document 113,230 to 27,638.208 Presumably
then, most Indiana voters approved of Article I, Section Eighteen and
would not have unduly punished justices who invoked it at least
occasionally.
For their part, Oregon voters ratified the Oregon Constitution by
a margin of more than two-to-one. 209 And even though Finch,2 10
affirming the death penalty in light of former Article I, Section
Fifteen, came more than fifty years after ratification, it still predated
the "tough on crime" movement by more than fifty years. Further
undermining the theory that the Oregon Supreme Court would have
faced negative political consequences for invoking former Article I,
Section Fifteen, Oregon voters abolished capital punishment shortly
after Finch, with a constitutional amendment in 1914.211
Second, justices in both states have proven willing to invalidate
sentences on other grounds, even when doing so could potentially
produce great public outcry. In State v. Quinn, the defendant argued
that Oregon's death penalty statute was unconstitutional.2 12 A statute
required the trial court judge to impose a death sentence if the judge
found one of several aggravating circumstances in a murder case.2 1 3

&

208. James Albert Woodburn, Constitution Making in Early Indiana: An Historical
Survey, 10 IND. MAG. HIST. 237, 246-47 (1914).
209. Oregon Ratifies the Constitution, OR. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://sos.oregon.gov
/archives/exhibits/constitution/Pages/after-ratify.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2017).
210. State v. Finch, 103 P. 505, 511 (Or. 1909).
211. State v. Quinn, 623 P.2d 630, 640 (Or. 1981), overruled by State v. Hall, 115 P.3d
908 (Or. 2005). The death penalty has been alternatively reinstated and abolished several times
since 1914. Aliza B. Kaplan, Oregon's Death Penalty: The PracticalReality, 17 LEWIS
CLARK L. REv. 1 (2013). It is currently instated, but under gubernatorial moratorium. Tony
Hernandez, Brown to Maintain Death Penalty Moratorium, OREGONIAN (Portland) (Oct. 19,
2016, 6:08 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2016/10/brown
_to maintaindeathpenalt.html.
212. Quinn, 623 P.2d at 640.
213. Id. at 642 (discussing OR. REv. STAT. § 163.116).
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The Oregon Supreme Court found this sentencing statute
unconstitutional because it violated Article I, Section Eleven of the
Oregon Constitution, 2 14 reading:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county
in which the offense shall have been committed; to be
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a
copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor; provided, however, that any accused person,
in other than capital cases, and with the consent of the
trial judge, may elect to waive trial by jury and
consent to be tried by the judge of the court alone,
such election to be in writing; provided, however, that
in the circuit court ten members of the jury may
render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and
except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder,
which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict,
and not otherwise; provided further, that the existing
laws and constitutional provisions relative to criminal
prosecutions shall be continued and remain in effect
as to all prosecutions for crimes committed before the
taking effect of this amendment.
It therefore set the defendant's sentence aside and remanded for
resentencing. 215 In Cannon v. Gladden, the defendant was convicted
of assault with attempt to commit rape of a child under sixteen years
of age.2 16 He received a life sentence.2 1 7 The Oregon Supreme Court
granted the defendant collateral relief, holding that a life sentence in
these circumstances violated the Oregon Constitution's requirement
that "[c]ruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, but all
penalties shall be proportioned to the offense." 2 18 Thus, the Oregon
214. Id. at 644.
2 15. Id.
216. Cannon v. Gladden, 281 P.2d 233, 234 (Or. 1955).
217. Id.
218. Id at 235 ("How can it be said that life imprisonment for an assault with intent to
commit rape is proportioned to the offense when the greater crime of rape authorizes a
sentence of not more than 20 years? It is unthinkable, and shocking to the moral sense of all
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Supreme Court has reversed sentences relying on bases other than
former Article I, Section Fifteen, despite the potential unpopularity of
their decisions.
The Indiana Supreme Court has also struck down a death penalty
statute. In French v. State, the court confronted an Indiana statute it
found to be similar to a North Carolina statute that the Supreme Court
of the United States had invalidated. 21 9 The statute required
imposition of the death penalty if certain aggravating circumstances
were present. 2 2 0 The Indiana high court read the Supreme Court's
decision in Woodson v. North Carolina2 2 1 to prohibit statutes that
made capital punishment mandatory and statutes that left the jury
excessive discretion. 222 Accordingly, since it found the statute similar
to the one struck down in Woodson, the Indiana Supreme Court
invalidated the statute as contrary to the U.S. Constitution's Eighth
Amendment. 22 3 Tellingly, the supreme court rejected the defendant's
argument that capital punishment violated Article I, Section Eighteen
of the Indiana Constitution in one sentence. 224
These were not isolated cases. For example, between 1993 and
2012, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed seventeen death sentences
on direct appeal or collateral review.2 25 The Oregon Supreme Court
reversed at least nine death sentences.22 6 So, Indiana and Oregon
courts have issued rulings favorable to politically unpopular criminals
(rapists and murderers) that would leave them vulnerable to a political

reasonable men as to what is right and proper, that in this enlightened age jurisprudence would
countenance a situation where an offender, either on a plea or verdict of guilty to the charge of
rape, could be sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of not more than 20 years, whereas if
he were found guilty of the lesser offense of assault with intent to commit rape he could spend
the rest of his days in the bastille."); see also State v. Shumway, 630 P.2d 796, 802 (Or. 1981).
219. French v. State, 362 N.E.2d 834, 837 (Ind. 1977).
220. Id. at 836-37.
221. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
222. French, 362 N.E.2d at 837.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Frank Sullivan, Jr., Selected Developments in Indiana Criminal Sentencing and
Death PenaltyLaw(1993-2012), 49 IND. L. REV. 1349, 1369 n.158 (2016).
226. State v. Langley, 273 P.3d 901, 915 (Or. 2012); State v. Rogers, 288 P.3d 544, 546
(Or. 2012); State v. Guzek, 153 P.3d 101, 109 (Or. 2007); State v. Guzek, 86 P.3d 1106, 1108
(Or. 2004), vacated, Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517 (2006); State v. Rogers, 4 P.3d 1261,
1264 (Or. 2000); State v. Langley, 16 P.3d 489, 490 (Or. 2000); State v. McDonnell, 987 P.2d
486, 487 (Or. 1999); State v. Guzek, 906 P.2d 272, 274 (Or. 1995), supersededby statute, OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1991), as recognizedin State v. Moore, 927 P.2d 1073, 1085
n.13; State v. Stevens, 879 P.2d 162, 162 (Or. 1994).
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backlash. A vote to vacate a sentence under the provisions would not
be more politically sensitive than a vote to vacate a sentence under,
say, Article I, Section Eleven of the Oregon Constitution or the U.S.
Constitution's Eighth Amendment. Therefore, a desire to avoid
looking soft on crime cannot explain the Indiana and Oregon courts'
unwillingness to invalidate a sentence under Article I, Section
Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution and former Article I, Section
Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution. Something else about the
constitutional sections themselves explains the courts' hesitancy.
B. JuisprudentialExplanations
Here, I consider five potential jurisprudential explanations for
why litigants have not successfully availed themselves of Article I,
Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution or former Article I,
Section Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution on appeal. I conclude that
the best explanation is that appellate judges perceive that they lack a
workable framework to evaluate challenges under these sections.
1. The Language is Directory and Not Mandatory
In Fleeno?7 and Baird,22 8 the Indiana Supreme Court found that
questioning the legislature's implementation of Article I, Section
Eighteen through the penal code would exceed the court's authority.
In fact, it was ambiguous to what extent the court considered the
section binding on the legislature at all in these decisions. In Fleenor,
the court termed the Article I, Section Eighteen an "admonition." 2 29
The Meriam- Webster Dictionarydefines "admonition" as "a gentle
or friendly reproof' or, "counsel or warning against fault or
oversight." 2 30 If in fact the court intended admonition to have such
meanings, then it seems that it views Article I, Section Eighteen as
directory instead of mandatory. Directory provisions of a state
constitution would be optional for the legislature to follow while
mandatory provisions would not. 2 31 However, this cannot ultimately

227. Fleenor v. State, 514 N.E.2d 80, 90 (Ind. 1987).
228. Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1179 (Ind. 1992).
229. Fleenor, 514 N.E.2d at 90 (citing Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759, 766 (Ind.
1982)).
230. Admonition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/admonition (last visited July 15, 2017).
231. See Directory Provision, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Directory
Requirement, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ("A statutory ... instruction to act
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explain Indiana and Oregon courts' reluctance to enforce the
respective constitutional sections. Courts have not consistently
adopted this position.232 Most notably in Hunter, the Indiana Supreme
Court provided extended analysis of whether incarcerating a juvenile
offender along with adults violated Article I, Section Eighteen of the
Indiana Constitution.23 3 In so doing, the court termed the provision as
one of the Indiana constitution's "mandates," which suggests it
viewed the provision as mandatory. 234
The best reading of Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution is that it is mandatory. There was a general presumption
around the time Indiana's constitution was drafted in 1851 that state
constitutional provisions are mandatory. 235 This was largely because
they fix the basic principles that would govern a particular state's
23
society.236
When Cooley wrote his treatise on state constitutions in
1868, he could find only a few instances where courts had interpreted
constitutional provisions as merely directory, and the logic underlying
those decisions is not applicable here.23 7 The New York Court of
Appeals was one of the few courts to find a state constitutional
provision directory in 1853. The provision read:
No bill shall be passed unless by the assent of a
majority of all the members elected to each branch of
the legislature, and the question upon the final passage
shall be taken immediately upon its last reading, and
the yeas and nays entered on the journal.2 38

in a way that is advisable, but not absolutely essential-in contrast to a mandatory
requirement. . .")
232. See Hunter v. State, 676 N.E.2d 14, 16-17 (Ind. 1996); see also Fointno v. State,
487 N.E.2d 140, 149 (Ind. 1986).
233. Hunter, 676 N.E.2d at 16-17.
234. Id. at 17.
235. Thomas Cooley, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 79 (Little, Brown,

& Co. ed., 1868).
236. Id. ("We are not therefore to expect to find in a constitution provisions which the
people, in adopting it, have not regarded of high importance, and worthy to be embraced .. [i]f
directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should be
exercised, there is a least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised
in that time and mode only[.]").
237. Id.
238. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. III, § 15.
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In People ex rel. Scott v. Supervisors of Chenango,239 a litigant
challenged a statute's constitutionality because a final tally of the ayes
and nays on the bill was not taken 24 0 after it had passed-after
conference committee negotiations between the senate and the
assembly amended the bill- and entered into the senate's journal.2 4 1
Even though the legislature had failed to literally follow the provision
in passing the law, the New York Court of Appeals nonetheless held
it constitutional.2 4 2 The court noted that the senate had entered such a
tally when it originally voted on the bill, and the house had done so
with the bill's final version.243
In dismissing the argument that the senate's failure to fully
follow the provision made the bill unconstitutional, the New York
Court of Appeals implicitly found that the provision was directory
because not following it did not make the process for passing the bill
illegitimate. 2 4 4 The court contrasted this provision with another
provision requiring a quorum to be present when a bill is passed.2 45
When a quorum is lacking, one could say that a final bill truly lacks
the consent of the governed.24 6 Not following Article III, Section
Fifteen of the New York Constitution of 1846 however had no such
consequence. The principle that seems to have driven the court's
decision in People ex rel. Scott v. Supervisors of Chenango is that a
constitutional provision is directory when not following it would not
undermine the constitution's basic premises. 24 7
When a society codifies how it will punish criminals and arrange
its justice system in a constitutional provision, declining to follow it is
to cast aside that constitution's fundamental principles. Like most
states and the federal government, Indiana has a section forbidding
cruel and unusual punishments. 248 Few would argue that it is simply
an "admonition" that a legislature could ignore at will if it wanted to
impose purposefully cruel punishments. Why are Article I, Section

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

People ex rel. Scott v. Supervisors of Chenango, 8 N.Y. 317 (1853).
Id at 317.
Id. at 317-328.
Id. at 328.
Id.
See id
Id. at 324-26.
Id.
Id.
IND. CONST. art. 1, §16.
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Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution and former Article I, Section
Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution any less binding?
Moreover, the use of the word shall in Article I, Section
Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution counsels in favor of viewing it as
mandatory. Shall is a form of the future tense that indicates that
something will certainly happen. Tellingly, Indiana and Oregon courts
themselves adopt the presumption that portions -of statutes using the
word shall are mandatory 24 9 unless it is clear from the context or
purpose of a statute that the legislature promulgating it intended a
different meaning for "shall." 25 0
To hold that Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution is only directory, one would need to believe that the
framers of the Indiana Constitution intended shall to mean something
like may. The best argument one can make in support of that
proposition is that the delegates at the 1851 convention rejected a
proposal to end the death penalty for all crimes except premeditated
murder. 25 1 Many modem legal scholars would view the death penalty
for a crime other than premeditated murder as necessarily
vindictive.2 52 If the convention accepted the imposition of vindictive
sentences in at least some cases, then the best inference seems to be
that the framers considered Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution as a general desire-or "admonition"- that legislatures
would follow in most cases, but could freely disregard if they desired.
However, in addition to arguing that capital punishment is actually
retributive instead of vindictive-a distinction the Article explores
later-one can also argue that capital punishment is necessary to
protect society. Some criminals are arguably so dangerous that they
will likely kill again once they leave prison or kill inmates or guards
while there. The only way to prevent this would be to impose a death
sentence. To the extent that capital punishment effectively deters
murder, it might also protect society from future murderers. These
rationales provide reasons beyond mere revenge against the offender
to support capital punishment.

&

249. See, e.g., Doyle v. City of Medford, 337 P.3d 797, 822 (Or. 2014); United Rural
Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 549 N.E.2d 1019, 1021-22 (Ind. 1990).
250. State exrel. Simpson v. Meeker, 105 N.E. 906, 907 (Ind. 1914).
251. Bodenhamer, supra note 13, at 365.
252. See, e.g., Sara F. Werboff, Halting the Sudden Descent into Brutality: How
Kennedy v. Louisiana Presentsa More RestrainedDeath Penalty Jurisprudence, 14 LEWIS
CLARK L. REv. 1601, 1634-45 (2010) (discussing role of vindictive justice in arguing against
capital rape statutes).
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2. The Sections Are Not Judicially Enforceable
On a related note, perhaps Fleenormeant to suggest that it was
beyond the power of courts to review how the legislature
implemented Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution
when it called it an "admonition to the legislature." Interestingly, the
Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. State suggests that the
section is mandatory, even though it also called it an "admonition." 253
To consider whether a court can review the actions of another branch
of government, I find it helpful to analogize to federal administrative
law. In cases involving agency actions for example, courts sometimes
conclude that something is "committed to agency discretion by
law." 2 54 In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court of the United
States weighed in on several prison inmates' challenge to the Federal
Drug Administration's decision not to commence enforcement actions
against states using drugs for lethal injection that allegedly violated
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.2 55 In deciding the case, the
Supreme Court decided that there was effectively "no law to apply" to
assess the agency's action.2 56
Similarly, one could try to argue that the provisions provide
insufficient guidance for Indiana and Oregon courts to use to evaluate
whether a legislature's sentencing schemes are compliant with said
provisions. 25 7 This would mean it is committed to the legislature's
discretion. 258
Indeed, the sections do leave some important questions
unanswered. If the penal code must be "founded on principles of
reformation," does that mean that a sentence could also be given for
deterrence, retribution, and incapacitation if the primary purpose of
the sentence was indeed rehabilitation? Does it mean that every
253. Smith v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1264, 1272 (Ind. 1997) (describing Article 1, Section 18
of the Indiana Constitution as "'an admonition to the legislative branch of the state government
and [that] is addressed to the public policy which the legislature must follow in formulating the
penal code,' not a mandate upon the judiciary for determining the appropriateness of the
sentence in a particular case.") (quoting Dillon v. State, 454 N.E.2d 845 (Ind. 1983)).
254. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
255. Id. at 823.
256. Id. at 831 ("[r]efusals to take enforcement steps generally involve precisely the
opposite situation, and in that situation we think the presumption is that judicial review is not
available. This Court has recognized on several occasions over many years that an agency's
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.").
257. Sceidat 830.
258. Seeid at 831.
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sentence in the code individually has to promote rehabilitation, or
does it mean that taken as a whole, the penal code's main object is to
promote rehabilitation? What does reformation really mean? Does it
mean rehabilitating someone to rejoin society once a sentence is
completed, or does it simply mean giving the prisoner a chance to
confront the character flaws that led to the commission of the crime?
I submit that there is law to apply even with the above
ambiguities. A sentence must meet two requirements. First, it must be
designed primarily to rehabilitate an offender. The best interpretation
of reformation in this context is that a sentence must rehabilitate an
offender for the purpose of facilitating return to free society. One of
the definitions of reform according to Noah Webster's original 1828
American Dictionary of the English Language259 is to "restore to a
former good state." 2 60 This is very similar to the first definition for
rehabilitate in the same dictionary: "To restore to a former
capacity." 2 61 The "good state" that existed prior to a crime was both a
lack of the character flaw that led to the crime, and therefore a life of
freedom where the person could be a contributing member of society.
Of course, this allows for more severe punishments for more serious
crimes. Article I, Section Sixteen of the Indiana Constitution and
Article I, Section Eighteen of the Oregon Constitution provides that
"[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense." A
legislature or sentencing judge could rationally believe that someone
who commits a serious crime such as homicide or rape must spend a
lengthy amount of time in prison because it will take many years to
resolve the issues-a basic lack of empathy and compassion, flagrant
disrespect for law-that led to the crime's commission.
It is also essential to determine what it means exactly for the
penal code to be "founded on the principles of reformation." 2 62 What
does founded mean? Exactly what quantum of a punishment must be
rehabilitative turns on this definition. The 1828 dictionary suggests
several possible meanings. The first three are "set," "fixed," and

259. I have chosen to use this dictionary since it was prominent during the midnineteenth century and would likely capture the definitions Americans during this time period
understood words to have.
260. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828) (definition of the verb, reform).
261. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828) (definition of the verb, rehabilitate).
262. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 18; OR. CONST. art. I, § 15 (amended 1996).

306

WILLAMETTE LA WREVIEW

[54:269

"established on a basis."2 63 These definitions of founded indicate that
punishments must be designed solely to reform. The fourth definition
provided is however "begun and built [upon]."2 64 The modem
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary provides a similar definition as the
1828 dictionary. The verb found can mean "to take the first steps in
building," "to set or ground on something solid," or "to establish
(something) often with provision for future maintenance." 265
This suggests that rehabilitation is the primary focus of punishmentthe foundation as it were of any sentence.2 66 However, one can always
build on a foundation. If this is true, then a court could add to a
sentence beyond what is necessary to rehabilitate in order to achieve
extra deterrence or incapacitation. Indeed, rehabilitation and
incapacitation are not mutually exclusive goals. A court could find
that an offender who is currently a danger to others needs to be
separated from society while rehabilitating. Moreover, the prospect of
arrest and punishment may deter some from committing crimes even
if the punishment's goal is rehabilitation.
A court could also add on to such a sentence for the sake of
retribution as long as a retributive sentence is clearly distinct from a
vindictive one. Legal scholars have argued that the two are
meaningfully different. 267 While a vindictive sentence would be based
on a desire for vengeance, one geared toward retribution would be
based on a desire for the criminal to give repayment to society and the
victim for what she had done. 268 In some sense, the criminal upset the
moral balance with a crime. A retributive punishment allows for
restoration of that balance. Unlike vengeance, retribution is not
personal, and society derives no pleasure or satisfaction from
inflicting the sentence.2 69
Second, a sentence must not be vindictive. Webster's 1828
dictionary defined vizdictive as "given to revenge." 27 0 In turn, it
263.

1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(1828) (definition of the past participle, founded)
2 6 4. Id.
265. Found, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/founded (last visited July 1, 2017).
266. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 381 (Ind. 2009) ("under our state Constitution,
the primary objective of punishment is rehabilitation.").
267. See Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
ArticulatedPurposeofCininalPunishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L REV. 1313, 1315-16 (2000).
268. Seeid
269. See id.
270. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
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makes a distinction between avenge, which meant "to inflict a just
punishment" 271 and revenge, "to inflict pain deliberately and
maliciously, contrary to the laws of justice and humanity, in return for
injury, pain, or evil suffered." 2 72 The modem dictionary defines
vindictive as "disposed to seek revenge," "intended for, or involving
revenge," and "intended to cause anguish or hurt." 2 73 Interestingly, it
does not make the distinction between revenge and avenge that the
1828 version does. It defines revenge as "to avenge (oneself or
another) usually by retaliating in kind or degree" or "to inflict
injury in return for . . . ."274 It defines
vengeance for or on behalf of." 275

avenge as "to take

The definition of vindictive provided in the modem dictionary"intended to cause anguish or hurt"-comes closest to how we use the
word in ordinary speech. To be sure, it is not easy to determine
whether a trial court gave a sentence merely "to cause anguish or
hurt," or whether a legislature prescribed certain sentences for the
same reasons. However, it is no more difficult than deciding whether
a sentence is "cruel and unusual," which courts often must do.
3. The Sections Only Apply to Challenges to the Whole Penal
Code
Another explanation is that Article I, Section Eighteen of the
Indiana Constitution and former Article I, Section Fifteen of the
Oregon Constitution do not allow for challenges to specific individual
provisions. Certainly, there are many cases from Indiana and Oregon
dating back to Driskillin 1855276 suggesting that courts adopted this
view.277 The text of Indiana's and Oregon's sections may demand
divergent answers to the question of whether a person can make an
(1828) (definition of the adjective, vindictive).
271.

1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(1828) (definition of the verb, avenge).
272. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

(1828) (definition ofthe verb, revenge).
273. Vindictive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/vindictive (last visited July 1, 2017).
274. Revenge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/revenge (last visited July 1, 2017).
275. Avenge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/avenge (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
276. Driskill v. State, 7 Ind. 338 (1855).
277. See, e.g., Hazelwood v. State, 3 N.E.3d 39, 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (collecting
cases); State v. Rhodes, 941 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
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individual challenge. Indiana's reads: "The penal code shall be
not
and
of
reformation,
the
principles
founded
on
78
2
Indiana's reference to the "penal code" as a
of vindictive justice."
whole might be taken as evidence that the drafters only wanted to
allow offenders to challenge the penal code as a whole, and not
individual sentencing statutes. Oregon's former section, however read
"Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles
of reformation, and not of vindictive justice." 27 9 Perhaps Oregon's
reference to "laws" plural, illustrates that the text allows an offender
to challenge individual sentencing statutes. Of course, it is possible
that "laws for the punishment of crime" meant to serve the same
function as "penal code," counseling that the two sections be read the
same way.
The theory that these sections do not allow for individual
challenges has not been universally accepted. For example, in
entertaining a juvenile's challenge to his confinement with adults, the
Hunter v. State Indiana high court allowed him to challenge state
correctional policy as applied to him personally. 280 Many other cases
do not state that a defendant can only challenge the whole penal code
in rejecting Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution or
former Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution
arguments.281
Such an interpretation is erroneous for two reasons. First, as a
practical matter, it would be nearly impossible for a defendant to
show that the entire penal code violated Article I, Section Eighteen of
the Indiana Constitution and former Article I, Section Fifteen of the
Oregon Constitution. Defense counsel would need to research every
sentencing provision in Oregon or Indiana, consider how they would
affect a range of possible offenders, and then try to make an overall
point about the penal code. The effect, then, of saying that these
constitutional sections do not permit individual challenges is to say
that they are not judicially enforceable. The only realistic way for
them to be judicially enforceable is to allow individual challenges.
Second, the fact that these sections are located in the bill of
rights' sections of the Indiana and Oregon constitutions supports

278. IND. CONST. art. I, § 18.
279. OR. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (amended 1996).
280. 676 N.E.2d 14, 16-17 (Ind. 1996);
281. See, e.g., Fointno v. State, 487 N.E.2d 140, 149 (Ind. 1986); Tuel, 379 P.2d 553,
555-56 (Or. 1963).
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allowing for individual challenges. The bill of rights is typically
understood as protecting individual rights against the government.282
Few would suppose that a citizen could only challenge a punishment
as cruel or unusual if attempting to argue that the entire penal code
was cruel or unusual. Nor would one say that that the right to free
expression only allowed a person to challenge all of a government's
restrictions on free speech at once as opposed to a particular
restriction affecting the challenger.
Third, treating Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution and former Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon
Constitution as only allowing challenges to the whole penal code
yields absurd possibilities. Imagine a situation where any reasonable
observer would find that a statute yields a vindictive sentence that
cannot possibly lead an offender capable of reform to actually reform.
Imagine too that the rest of the penal code was reasonably likely to
reform potential offenders and that it was not vindictive. If we take
seriously the notion that Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution and former Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon
Constitution do not permit individual challenges, then courts would
have to tolerate a sentence that vitiated the spirit of Article I, Section
Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution and former Article I, Section
Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution. Or, imagine another scenario
where a reasonable observer could conclude that the penal code as a
whole was largely vindictive and unlikely to lead most potential
offenders to reform. But in the case at hand, the relevant statute
produced a sentence that was not vindictive, and was likely to reform
the offender in question. Again, accepting the logic that these
constitutional sections allow challenges to the entire penal code even
as they preclude individual challenges would mean that an offender in
such a case would prevail.28 3
4. Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution and
Former Article I, Section Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution
Are Not Standalone Inquiries
Conley

84

suggests that the Indiana Supreme Court viewed

Article I, Section Eighteen as part of a larger inquiry into whether a
punishment was cruel or unusual instead of a separate standalone
282. ButseeOR. CONST. art. I, § 39.
283. See Teer v. State, 738 N.E.2d 283, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
284. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012).
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inquiry. Conley devoted substantial analysis to the question of
whether sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility
of parole violated the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, and concluded that it
was not. 2 85 Then, in short succession, Conley mentioned Article I,
Section Sixteen 286 and Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution before considering whether life without parole was cruel
and unusual under the Indiana Constitution. 287 Tellingly, it stated that
Article I, Sections Sixteen and Eighteen provided the same
protections as the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment. 2 88 Perhaps
Conleymeans to imply that a punishment is cruel and unusual if there
is no rehabilitative component. Quoting an earlier opinion, 289 Conley
stated that a punishment would be cruel and unusual if it made "no
measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment." 290 Since
Conley seemed to envision Article I, Section Eighteen as part of the
cruel and unusual punishment inquiry, it follows that a punishment
would be cruel and unusual if it did not measurably contribute to an
offender's rehabilitation.
However, Conley is unique in suggesting that Article I, Section
Eighteen is part of a larger cruel and unusual punishment inquiry, so
this rationale for not invoking it (standing alone) to invalidate a
sentence necessarily cannot explain the vast majority of the
jurisprudence on the section. Moreover, to the extent Conley really
meant to stand for the proposition that Article I, Section Eighteen was
only a factor to be taken into account when applying the Indiana
Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, this
reading of the text of Article I, Section Eighteen is untenable. If
potential for rehabilitation were really just part of the cruel and
unusual punishment inquiry, we would expect something to that effect
to be included in the text of Article I, Section Sixteen itself. Treating
Article I, Section Eighteen this way, then, would make it meaningless
that the drafters of Indiana's constitution chose to make it a separate
section.

285. Id. at 877-80.
286. IND. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All
penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.").
287. Conley, 972 N.E.2d at 880.
2 8 8. Id.
289. Id. at 879-80 (citing Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind. 2000)).
290. Id.
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5. Appellate Judges Felt They Lacked a Workable Framework
to Apply Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana
Constitution and Former Article I, Section Fifteen of the
Oregon Constitution.
One remaining explanation for Indiana and Oregon courts'
failure to invoke their respective constitutional sections is that they
had no framework in which to apply them given their professional
training. Before going further, we must recognize that it is a relatively
narrow time period providing most of the cases interpreting or
applying these provisions: the mid-to-late twentieth century. Aside
from Driskilland Rice, only a handful of such cases arose during the
nineteenth century. 291
A focus on rehabilitation places great discretion in judges'
hands.292 But they received little training during law school or
afterwards on sentencing.293 The result was that they "were
functioning as diagnosticians without authoritative texts, surgeons
without Gray's Anatomy." 294 While retribution, deterrence, and
incapacitation are relatively intuitive concepts, effective rehabilitation
is not. Methods that seemed like they would rehabilitate offenders,
such as putting them in solitary confinement, may even have made
things worse.2 95 Appellate judges have no more of a framework than
trial court judges or legislators to assess how to rehabilitate an
offender. So why question a trial court or a legislature's choice when
they lacked the expertise to do so? In the absence of robust judicial
review of sentencing decisions, trial court judges rarely wrote the
reasoned opinions justifying their sentences that might have
developed standards to apply the provisions.29 6

291. Miller v. State, 49 N.E. 894, 895 (Ind. 1898) (briefly mentioning IND. CONST. art. 1,
18 in the context of a challenge to the trial court's overruling of a motion for a new trial);
State v. Otis, 34 N.E. 954, 955 (Ind. 1893) (citing IND. CONST. art. 1, § 18 in dicta as support
for its finding that a man charged with seduction could not be convicted when he married the
witness he seduced); State v. Hattabough, 66 Ind. 223, 242 (1879) (Biddle, J., dissenting)
(listing IND. CONST. art. I, § 18 along with several other constitutional provisions, but making
no use of it).
292. Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too
Much Law, orfustRight, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691-708, 695 (2010).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 696-97.
295. Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prisoner Inmates: A
BriefHistoryand Review ofthe Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 466 (2006).
296. Id.
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Although courts have given various explanations for their refusal
to vindicate a challenge under these sections, most of them share a
common theme of reserving as much flexibility as possible for trial
court judges and legislatures to decide whether rehabilitation was
possible in a given case and how to achieve it. 2 97 Holding that Article
I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution and former Article I,
Section Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution are not judicially
enforceable leaves the legislature with complete discretion over
whether, or how, to rehabilitate an offender. Holding that the sections
are directory and not mandatory yields the same result. As a practical
matter, holding that the provisions only allow challenges to the whole
penal code meant that individual challenges never succeed, leaving
the legislature and trial court with unfettered discretion.
Another reason that judges never developed such a framework is
their reliance on federal law as informing the source of rights. Former
Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde observed that the U.S.
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment "has led many state courts and
the lawyers who practice before them to ignore the state's law,
enforcing only those personal rights guaranteed by federal law, or to
assume that the state's own guarantees must reflect whatever the
United States Supreme Court finds in their federal analogues."2 98
Moreover, when an "issue arises in an area in which the Supreme
Court has been active, lawyers generally stop citing the state's own
law and decisions to the state court, and the court abandons reference

297. Tuel v. Gladden, 379 P.2d 553, 555 (Or. 1963) ("Coupled with this necessity for
protecting society is the knowledge that it is difficult to determine whether or not a person has
really reformed and how permanent this reformation is. The petitioner's history is an example
of this difficulty. Twice he was thought to be reformed to the extent that he could be released
from confinement; and twice it was found that such a conclusion was erroneous.. .The motive
of the legislature in enacting the Habitual Criminal Act here attacked could be found to be as
follows:... the odds of true and permanent reformation of one who has already committed
four felonies are so outweighed by the odds that a four-time repeater will continue to be a
menace to a community if he is released from his confinement that the obligation to protect the
people of this state justifies the passage of a compulsory life sentence for a four-time felon.").
298. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REv. 379, 382 (1980); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 879 (Ind. 2012) ("We now
turn to the state constitutional analysis. The Indiana Constitution can provide more protections
than the United States Constitution provides. Justice v. State, 552 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ind. Ct.
App.1990). Our Constitution provides in pertinent part 'Cruel and unusual punishments shall
not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.' IND. CONST.
art.1, § 16. 'The penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not
of vindictive justice.' IND. CONST. art.1, § 18. Although the language is not the same as the
United States Constitution, the protections are the same.").
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to the state constitution." 2 99 This helps explain why Indiana's
supreme court relied solely on the U.S. Supreme Court's cruel and
unusual jurisprudence to strike down Indiana's capital punishment
statute while giving only cursory mention to relevant Indiana
-- 300
constitutional provisions.

V. A FRAMEWORK FOR ARTICLE I, SECTION EIGHTEEN OF THE
INDIANA CONSTITUTION

The Article argues above that appellate judges have hesitated to
enforce Article I, Section Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution
because they lack a workable framework to use when applying it. In
resolving constitutional questions, Indiana courts "examin[e] the
language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its
drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution,
and case law interpreting the specific provisions."3 0 1 This Part
presents a framework Indiana courts could use to evaluate Article I,
Section Eighteen challenges, deriving from the section's text and
attempts to give it meaning. The gist, as argued in section IV, is that
any sentence must be designed primarily to promote rehabilitation
save for exceptional circumstances, and even then, cannot be
vindictive. To reword Article I, Section Eighteen to clarify the
meaning this Article advocates: "Unless there is good reason to
believe that an offender will not likely reform in the foreseeable
future, the justice system must prescribe punishments primarily to
achieve rehabilitation. In no case may a sentence be vindictive."
Defendants would be able to argue that a sentencing statute facially
violates Article I, Section Eighteen, or that it does so when applied to
their particular circumstances.
A. FacialChallenge
To argue that a statutory sentencing scheme inherently violated
Article I, Section Eighteen, a defendant would need to show either:
(1) that there is no bona fide reason to think a sentence would reform
his particular class of criminals (e.g., thieves) and that there has been
no showing that that class of defendants cannot reform, (2) or that a
sentence is inherently vindictive.
299. Linde, supra note 298, at 387.
300. See French v. State, 362 N.E.2d 834, 837 (Ind. 1977).
301. Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind. 1996) (quoting Ind. Gaming
Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Ind. 1994)).
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1. There is no bona fide reason to think a sentence would
reform a particular class of criminals (e.g., thieves) and
there has been no showing that that class of defendants
cannot reform
The first inquiry in a facial challenge would be whether a
particular class of defendants can reform. The reason a defendant
would have to demonstrate being part of a particular class of
criminals is that facial challenges to a statute's constitutionality do not
allow for the consideration of a person's specific circumstances. 302 A
facial challenge would argue that the portion of a statute providing
sentences for particular crimes is unconstitutional in all cases. 303 In
evaluating a facial challenge, courts could adopt a rebuttable
presumption that a particular class of defendants can reform. The
reason springs from the text of Article I, Section Eighteen of the
Indiana Constitution itself, which logically must assume that
criminals can reform if it mandates that punishments be designed to
rehabilitate. Assuming the state could not show a particular class of
defendants cannot reform, the court should use something akin to
rational basis review. A sentencing statute would be harmonious with
Article I, Section Eighteen if its overall thrust demonstrated a rational
connection to the objective of rehabilitation. 304 To be sure, most facial
challenges to sentencing statutes would likely fail. 305 Chief among
several reasons for the likely failure of most challenges is the wide
range of punishments possible for the same crime. For example, theft
of property valued at $50,000 or more could lead to a sentence from
one year-to-six years and a fine of anywhere between $0 and
$10,000.306 This wide range of discretion means a statute could yield

a sentence focused on rehabilitation in one case, and a sentence that
was not in another.
If the legislature persuasively demonstrated a high likelihood
that a particular class of criminals could not reform, it could prescribe
punishments solely to protect society-to incapacitate and deter302.
legislative
challenger
valid.").
303.
304.
305.
(2012).
306.

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a
Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
See id.
See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
Susannah W. Pollvogt, UnconstitutionalAnimus, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 887, 899
IND. CODE

§

35-43-4-2 (West 2018); IND. CODE

§ 35-50-2-6(c)

(West 2018).
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although any sentence could still not evince vindictiveness. This
ability is proper in such cases because there are indeed some cases
where the foremost consideration must be protecting society. 307 For
example, if a serial killer had been captured after escaping from
prison, committed more murders, and stated a desire to commit more
murders, most would accept that the most important consideration in
passing sentence would be how to best protect society from further
predations. Given a long track record of heinous crimes and plainlystated desire to persist in such crimes moreover, the only logical
conclusion to draw is that this person would be unlikely to ever
reform. Similarly, a legislature would have a particularly strong
argument that a defendant will likely not reform when the person has
a long track record of violence, or when a defendant has repeatedly
committed the same crime. 30 8 This idea is similar to the future
dangerousness inquiry some states require in capital punishment
cases. 309 Whether certain offenders pose grave risks to others is
highly relevant to whether the legislature should be permitted to
punish with the sole goal of protecting society rather than also
facilitating an offender's return to society. That said, research
surrounding the accuracy of future dangerousness assessments
understandably evokes concern. 310 In deciding that certain offenders
pose sufficiently great risks such that protection of society must be
the only consideration, the legislature should do so only when there is
robust statistical and scientific support for such findings.
Even if the legislature advanced a persuasive justification for
why a class could not likely reform, a reviewing court would still
consider whether the statute was inherently vindictive. There are at
least two ways a defendant could show that a statute should be
considered vindictive. First, the defendant could demonstrate that the
range of sentences under the statute are so disproportionate to achieve
a necessary degree of incapacitation and deterrence that those
307. See Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 332, 338 (1855).
308. See Tuel v. Gladden, 379 P.2d 553, 555-56 (Or. 1963)
309. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos:
Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1849-50
(2003).
310. See, e.g, Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How "Future
Dangerousness"Catches the Least Culpable CapitalDefendants and Undermines the Rationale
for the Executions It Supports, "35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 166-67 (2008). Mental health experts
have debated the extent to which they can successfully predict future violence on the part of
convicts. John F. Edens et al., Predictionsof Future Dangerousnessin CapitalMurder Trials:
Is It Time to "Disinventthe Wheel?"29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 55, 60 (2005).
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rationales cannot alone explain the statute-instead suggesting also a
vindictive purpose. In such a case where the statutory scheme is
disproportionate to legitimate penological objeQtives, there would
likely be a violation of Article I, Section Sixteen of the Indiana
Constitution which requires that "[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned
to the nature of the offense." If appellate judges are hesitant to
invalidate a sentence under Article I, Section Eighteen because they
do not feel they have a framework, they would likely use Article I,
Section Sixteen to strike the statute down instead.
Second, even in less egregious cases, Indiana courts could
invalidate a statute if they found a desire to retaliate or get revenge
against particular defendants in fact motivated the statute's
enactment. Such an argument would be similar to the animus doctrine
sometimes invoked by federal courts in equal protection and
substantive due process analysis. 3 11 A sentencing statute could not be
premised on "a bare [legislative] desire to harm a politically
unpopular group [of criminals]."312 In examining whether a statute is
vindictive, Indiana courts could consider its legislative history.
Isolated statements illustrating vindictiveness would likely not be
sufficient to invalidate the statute. Instead, Indiana courts would need
to find that vindictiveness was the primary motivating factor behind
the statute.3 13 It would be rare for Indiana courts to conclude a statute
is vindictive on its face, but the option should be available in
particularly egregious cases.3 14
B. As-Applied Challenge
If a sentence facially complies with Article I, Section Eighteen
of the Indiana Constitution, either because the legislature has
demonstrated that a class of defendants is unlikely to reform, or,
much more frequently, because a sentence is rationally related to
311. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (finding an
equal protection violation based on "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group" in Congress's 1971 amendment, Pub. L. No. 91-671, § 2, 84 Stat. 2048, to
the Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, § 3, 78 Stat. 703 to prevent hippies and
hippie communes from eligibility); see also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013)
(invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) as a
"bare congressional desire to harm" same-sex couples).
312. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
313. See id. ("As a result, '[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of
itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify
the 1971 amendment."').
314. Pollvogt, supra note 305, at 892.
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promoting rehabilitation for the class of criminals, defendants could
still challenge a sentence as-applied in particular cases. These cases
would often challenge the sentence itself, arguing that the court had
used its broad discretion under sentencing statutes to impose a
sentence that did not promote rehabilitation. 31 5 For example, someone
convicted of a class A felony could receive as few as twenty years in
prison and as many as fifty. 31 6 In addition, a court can-but is not

required to- completely depart from the normal ranges and suspend
the entire sentence. 3 17 Finally, a sentencing court can add years
beyond what the statutory guidelines suggest if the prosecutor charges
an enhancement (e.g., under a habitual offender statute) where the
court could add an additional six to twenty years for a level one, two,
three, or four felony. 31 8
In a trial's penalty phase, the prosecution should bear the burden
of proving to the trial court by clear and convincing evidence that a
specific defendant cannot likely reform if it seeks to impose a
sentence that is based solely on incapacitation and deterrence instead
of on rehabilitation. 319 For example, when the prosecution seeks the
death penalty or life without parole for a murderer-sentences
foreclosing the possibility of returning an offender to society-the
state would need to show, given the totality of the circumstances, that
the offender was unlikely to reform. The state would undoubtedly
meet this burden in an Article I, Section Eighteen challenge by a
serial killer who has committed several violent offenses in the past
and expresses a desire to keep murdering in the future. Similarly, if
prosecutors sought a prison sentence of such length that it would
practically preclude returning an offender to society, the prosecution
would have to show that reform is unlikely. For example, consider a
fifty-year old defendant who has committed a burglary that led to
serious injury, and who would qualify as a habitual offender because
of past non-violent felony convictions. That offender could face a

315. Gertner, supra note 292, at 691 ("Different theories of sentencing, in turn, confer
power on different sentencing players. For example, rehabilitation theories necessarily
enhanced the role of judges and parole officers, the purported experts in individualized
punishment aimed at 'curing' deviant behavior.").
316. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-4 (West 2018).
317. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-2 (West 2018).
318. § 35-50-2-4.
319. See Richard Husseini, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and
Convincing Evidence as the Burden ofProof 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1387, 1407 (1990).
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fifty-year prison sentence. 320 A fifty-year sentence would, in all
likelihood, prevent return to society, so the prosecution would need to
show that the offender was unlikely ever to reform if it sought to
impose such a sentence. An Article I, Section Eighteen challenge in
this case would have a much greater chance of success.
The possibility of withholding parole if an offender is still
dangerous should assuage concerns that this system could return a
dangerous offender to society. Under a system aimed at reformation,
an offender who receives a sentence of life with the possibility of
parole is evaluated for release by the parole board based on the
offender's conduct in prison rather than simply being bound to the
trial court's prediction in denying the possibility of parole years
before.
To prove that a particular defendant cannot be rehabilitated
(regardless of whether that is generally true for defendants who
commit a particular crime) the clear and convincing evidence best
balances the competing interests. 32 1 Requiring the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a convicted criminal cannot
reform is too high of a burden. With the right evidence, one can prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that someone committed a crime. Whether
a person will change the attitudes and habits that led to particularly
egregious crimes or repeated offenses years in the future is always
subject to doubt. Even the worst criminals may one day truly change.
However, that possibility has to be weighed against society's need to
protect itself from the most dangerous criminals. A clear and
convincing evidence standard still requires the prosecution to a make
a persuasive case that a particular defendant is unlikely to reform.
Preponderance of the evidence would be inappropriate since it is used
primarily in civil proceedings and grand jury indictments. 322 hen
life and liberty are at stake, the government typically assumes a
higher burden of proof to ensure it has made a compelling case that it
should deprive someone of these core rights. In the context of
sentencing, life and liberty are both at stake, and so a higher burden of
proof is appropriate.
An alternative balancing of the interests would shift the burden
of proof to the defendant after the state has proven that a class of
320. See [ND. CODE § 35-50-2-4.5 (West 2018); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-8(i) (West 2018).
321. See Husseini, supra note 319.
322. Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Tials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 401, 405
(1986).
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defendants likely cannot reform. The state's showing that a class of
defendants likely cannot reform would create a rebuttable
presumption that a particular defendant likely cannot reform either.
The defendant would have to affirmatively convince the trial court
that reformation is possible. Keeping the burden of proof with the
state in individual cases, rather than shifting it to the defendant
undoubtedly places a significant onus on the prosecution. After the
prosecution has shown that the legislature had good reason to
conclude that a class of criminals was likely beyond rehabilitation, it
would have to show that the particular defendant is also beyond
rehabilitation. In other cases, the prosecution would have to show that
a legislature's sentencing schemes for particular crimes were
rationally calculated to rehabilitate a class of criminals, and that in an
individual case, it is rational to think that a sentence will rehabilitate a
particular defendant. Despite the hardship, the state should bear the
burden of proof in both instances. The goal of the provision, as I have
argued is not just to ensure a focus on rehabilitation generally, but in
specific individual cases too. Giving the government the burden of
proof in both instances will help ensure that it has adequately focused
on how best to rehabilitate an individual. Given the amount of leeway
prosecutors typically have to seek a wide range of sentences, it is
especially important that they consider and prove how a particular
sentence will promote rehabilitation.
C Appellate Review
In appellate review, Indiana courts should adjudicate facial
challenges to Indiana's sentencing statute de novo. Within a short
time, Indiana courts will have considered different classes of
criminals, such as thieves, drug dealers, murderers, and repeat
offenders and rendered judgment on whether the possible sentence for
those crimes generally complies with Article I, Section Eighteen of
the Indiana Constitution. A facial challenge to whether the legislature
properly concluded that a class of criminals cannot likely reform, or
that the sentencing statute is not rationally calculated to produce that
effect is not a pure question of law. 32 3 Indeed, looking at the evidence

323. Prominent legal thinkers including Justice Antonin Scalia have questioned the
distinction between fact and law. Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1188 (1989) ("1 frankly do not know why we treat some of these questions
matters of fact and others as matters of law. I imagine that their relative importance to our
liberties has much to do with it.").
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the legislature considered about certain types of criminals and how
certain sentences would likely work is also a fact-based inquiry.
However, it is not the sort of inquiry that a trial court judge is better
able to perform. On questions of fact where trial court judges receive
considerable deference, a judge has heard all of the evidence while
presiding at trial, and is said to be better able to pick up on important
nuances that are not readily conveyed in an appellate record.32 4 In a
facial challenge to a sentence under Article I, Section Eighteen of the
Indiana Constitution, however, neither the trial court nor the appellate
court witnessed the legislative debates first-hand. Neither is it likely
that a trial court would spend more time considering one sentencing
issue during a trial, even with a separate sentencing phase, presenting
several other issues than an appellate court that is likely focusing its
review on a narrower set of issues.
In deciding the standard of review appellate courts should use to
assess lower court findings that a particular person cannot reform, or
whether a particular sentence is rationally calculated to reform a
particular criminal, it is important to decide whether these are
questions of law or questions of fact. Whether a person can likely
reform seems closer to a fact-based inquiry since the court looks to
mitigating and aggravating circumstances of a crime and the person's
prior history to make the best prediction possible. This is similar to
the inquiry the court makes when it weighs all of the evidence in a
case to determine if someone is guilty of a crime. Appellate courts in
Indiana use a "substantial evidence" standard in reviewing guilty
verdicts, 32 5 thus that standard could also be used to review findings of
whether a person could reform. If there was substantial evidence to
support a trial court's conclusion that an individual could not reform,
the appellate court would not disturb that finding. 326
VI. CONCLUSION

Two lessons are evident from Indiana's and Oregon's
experiments in constitutionalizing rehabilitation.
First, Indiana defense lawyers would be well-advised not to
waste time appealing a sentence under Article I, Section Eighteen of
324. See, eg, State v. Russum, 333 P.3d 1191, 1200 (Or. Ct. App 2014) (court of
appeals defers "to a trial court's findings of credibility where they are based on an opportunity
to see and hear witnesses").
325. Bivins v. State, 433 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind. 1982).
326. See id.
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the Indiana Constitution. Unless they can satisfy the stringent criteria
for the doctrine of amelioration, they will not succeed. If they wish to
argue that a particular sentence forecloses rehabilitation, they would
be better served to argue that the sentence is disproportionate and
violates Article I, Section Sixteen of the Indiana Constitution.
Second, those seeking to make a penal code promoting
rehabilitation nationwide should spend their time lobbying members
of the legislative and executive branch. Politicians in Indiana and
Oregon have showed at least occasional interest in Article I, Section
Eighteen of the Indiana Constitution and former Article I, Section
Fifteen of the Oregon Constitution. Demonstrating why rehabilitative
models of punishment would reduce crime and save taxpayer dollars
may persuade politicians. Appellate judges will likely not enforce
such provisions as they have not developed frameworks to use.

